A Handbook on Counter-Terror Operations
(Dedicated to one of the finest Armies, in general, that anyone can be rightly proud to have been associated with and to all young officers in particular, that make this Army, what it is)
(No religion is responsible for terrorism. People are responsible for violence and terrorism).
Barack Obama.
Premise
Pakistan has suffered the consequences of violent militancy and terrorism since its very inception, however, in the recent months in particular and the last few years in general, incidents of terrorism have been on the rise. Pakistan and its Army along with affiliated institutions stood world-wide as examples in the conduct of counter insurgency operations. The conduct, methods and techniques adopted by the Pakistan Army were recognised universally as examples in how to deal with terrorism. It even led to the establishment of an international teaching institution at Pabbi, Kharian for training purposes related to counter terrorism. Yet now, in the year 2025, Pakistan stands out as a very dangerous country with a huge spike in violence and terrorism. It is accused of being a country soft on terrorism and indifferent to the violence within it. What then happened, what went wrong, what needs to be done, how and when.
There is now a dire need to correct the course we are coasting along and to earnestly combat insurgency/terrorism so as to halt this descent into chaos? This pamphlet tries to connect the various aspects of terrorism that have plagued Pakistan and attempts to establish an approach that has its moorings in a doctrinal orientation leading to practical manifestation on the ground. The document is intended for young officers but it also touches on the much bigger picture of why, how and what of the genesis of terrorism and insurgency, in their universal as well as local domestic sense. With the experience of handling such situations for years, our law-enforcement agencies and institutions should have been in a better position than what they currently are displaying and employing on ground. They should have, by now, been able to comprehend and grasp the evolving situation rather than apparently getting over-awed by it – the wheel does not need to be re-invented while everything lies before us – lessons from the past.
Connecting with the past allows for continuity of thought and conduct, purpose of effort and direction in execution so that procedural matters and tactical application become richer and stronger, rather get diluted in time and space. The practical manifestation of security duties and physical application of resources must never be forgotten or ignored even when peace at times seems to return or when violence waxes and vanes, displaying its fluid nature. Our youth should never have to suffer the consequences of learning everything all over again, especially, the hard way. Whereas this document cannot provide all the answers to the questions terrorism throws out, yet it can offer a level-platform from where each case study can be examined, analysed, dissected and responded to in keeping with its respective environmental situation.
1. General
Terrorism is a complicated global phenomenon that has come to stay and we all shall, as we do now, and, in the future as well, bear witness to continuing carnage and seemingly mindless destruction. As States propagate wars to resolve political conflicts, belligerents will continue to search for new ways to overpower one another. However, with the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their intensity, volume and extended distances of application, the character of conflict has now made war more absolute and total, possibly resulting in the complete annihilation of the adversary or an equally devastating reaction by him as he responds. Thus, under the prevailing environment, if nations insist in prosecuting wars, as usual, with the current technical capacities and the arsenal available to them, then the nature of such future war will be swayed by the pendulum leaning towards total war as opposed to limited war and no one wishes to take such an unacceptably huge risk. Total war, here would imply, the unrealistic proposition of the complete annihilation of the enemy, and so whereas, wars may have to be continued with, but the methods and the means, would be radically different, as is already becoming apparent. This has now has opened new vistas to the novel concept of ‘limited wars’ – a far more all-encompassing phenomenon, a product of default, more than design.
Limited wars would compel the enemy to capitulate on account of a series of limited hostile actions, graduated and incremental, spread over a large spectrum, but would still be, a relatively less expensive, less destructive and a far more cost effective process in committing resources and loss of human lives – thus bringing another method to madness – war. Thus with the full cognisance of the ensuing volume of destruction over large expanse of spaces and the consequences of such irreversible damage, a kind of reluctant deterrence has been imposed upon warring states who have now begun to search and perfect new ways to continue war by other means – under the shadow of unconventional capacities. Nations, now, prefer to project their political objectives and power potential through Low Intensity Conflictual Events – causing enough pain to realise their objective but not enough to trigger chaotic responses. In these scenarios, application of hostilities is measured and progressive, forcing the other side to capitulate, who, having been brought to their culmination point at some moment in time and having exhausted their responses, have no other alternative, but to give in. This kind of war, is in fact much more all-inclusive and far bigger than a simple military conflict.
Military analysts, bewildered with the new method to conflict, have started labelling every new application of low intensity war by allocating a progressive-generation-ranking to them, or by fancy titles, such as ‘hybrid wars’ etc. Yet, such conflicts are still wars and are in fact all the same – just wars. When a conflict must qualify to be termed as a war, by any means or by any terms, it must then always have to be the product of the tell-tale Clausewitzian Trinity, ‘Chance, Policy, and Violence’ without which it could not be classified as ‘war’. Such conflicts can invariably include hostile initiatives such as the disruption of economic activity, infrastructure, communication, trade, and hostile diplomacy. These conflicts are also characterised by the exploitation of aggrieved communities and distressed societies that feel disenfranchised or are made to feel so, thus easily being manipulated into rebelling against their own authorities.
A combination of activities is undertaken in synergy for such a manoeuvre to succeed. A popular course of action is where deceptive international financial regulatory agencies, misuse the space they are given and under the pretext of monetary assistance to the target nations, bankrupt them into some sort of compliance or other. Fomenting of unrest, social polarisation is pursued through creating notions of and structuring disruptive narratives, making a case for deprived peoples, human rights and democracy. Internal divisions are manipulated to facilitate a regime change to bring forth a more flexible regime that is more amiable to direction and dictation, not of their own people, but of other nations. This method has now become the alternative to totally annihilating the opposing side by the entirety of destruction imposed upon humanity through the weapons of mass destruction at the disposal of warring-belligerents.
Thus war continues but in other ways. Conflict now has expanded to events executed by proxies, sometimes violent as in protests and riots and at other times by the deliberate misuse and calibrated mishandling of governance, law enforcement and intelligence agencies. These events are supplemented by hostile powers who are in a position to apply a literal siege through sanctions and embargoes as well as other financial pressures. The assertions of such hostile nations lead to catastrophic events and yet remain a deniable act in the larger context of global political propriety. Such is the method, and a preferred way to continue war by other means.
A method to brow beat nations that are financially weak, technically challenged and have security problems and who are hugely vulnerable to such tactics; these nations can be manipulated, coerced and press-ganged into supporting international events that they never wished to participate in but having lost all autonomy and complete sovereignty are compelled to reluctantly support some higher power in their endeavours. Thus to undertake such hostile activity, in its full spectrum and for external influence to take root, an environment needs to be created. Such an environment is established best through controlled chaos, regulated lawlessness, destroying the writ of the government, corruption, narco-trade, smuggling and a complete breakdown in governance. The primary method to such chaos lies in terrorism and insurgency – terminologies that have a different meaning for different people, depending on where they stand. Freedom struggles for one are insurgencies for others; liberation-movements for some are acts of terrorism to another. When in search for responses to such a kind of conflict, the very nature and character of this kind of war demands that the response go far above and beyond the limited capacity of the military. This brings us to a new reality to the age old adage, ‘wars are too important to be left to the generals alone’. Therefore the response has to be at the State level using all elements of State power to quell the conflict where it stands.
2. Global Definitions of Terrorism
We begin further examination of ‘Terrorism’ as the world sees it and describes it. However, one is at wits end to arrive at a common definition that is acceptable to all and no such designation that satisfies everyone exists. The United Nations does not officially define terrorism and only ‘elaborates’ it through the Security Council Resolution 1566, 2004, that terrorist acts are “Criminal acts, including against civilians, committed with intent to cause death or serious bodily injury, or taking hostages, with a purpose to provoke a state of terror……for political purposes”. The European Union attempted to define it as well, in June 2002, and produced a vague statement “about offences under national law, which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation and committed with the aim of …..”.
They pointedly added, “that actions by armed forces during periods of armed conflict and actions of the armed forces of a state in the exercise of their official duties are governed by this framework…”. Both statements are benign, ambiguous and have an air of plausible deniability. This is a classic example of the refined art, of first situating a definition to fit a pre-conceived accusation, and then exploiting that for political gains, through a pre-conceived judgment in selecting the guilty country. This remains the product of adroit narrative manufacturing and creates a suitable casus-belie to censure a state that does not conform to what the power-that-be is demanding. Rosalyn Higgins, President of the International Court for Justice 2006-9, stated,
“Terrorism is a term without legal significance. It is merely a convenient way of alluding to activities, whether of States or of individuals, widely disapproved of and in which either the methods used are unlawful, or the targets are protected, or both”.
So although there is no Global definition for terrorism, for the purpose of establishing an appropriate parameter for further discussion within this paper, we shall settle for the wide definition of terrorism as follows: ‘Terrorism is a calculated use of violence to create a general climate of fear within the population and thereby bring about a particular objective which could be political, nationalistic, revolutionary or religious.’
3. Fatalities and Terrorism
So having so far confirmed that there is no legal framework or a universally acceptable definition for the ‘terrorism’, but, as one goes on to examine that what is it about terrorism, which so infatuates the world at large, it appears that the casualties caused by militancy does trouble the world. Fatalities that violence causes annually at a global level should be of a serious cause for concern, and apparently, it is. But when seen in the context of global deaths overall, each day, there are also, 25,000 people, including more than 10,000 children, who die from hunger and related causes.
Some 854 million people worldwide are estimated to be undernourished, and high food prices may drive another 100 million into poverty and hunger; (United Nations data). Worldwide, about 0.5 million deaths are attributable to drug use. More than 70% of these deaths are related to opioids. It is estimated that alcohol contributes to around three million deaths worldwide per year (statista). Each year, 1.35 million people are killed on road-accidents around the world, (CDC- statista). Yet, terrorism, over the past decade, killed an average of 26,000 people worldwide each year (UN Data). The global death toll from terrorism over the past decade ranged from 8,200 in 2011 to a high of 44,600 in 2014. In 2017, terrorism was responsible for 0.05% of global deaths; (Our World in Data). So having first established that the term ‘terrorism’ is more of a political tool to beat one’s opponents with rather than a phenomenon driven by concern for human lives, we can safely conclude that deaths all over the world, caused by other factors, really do not matter.
However, it is pertinent to express, at this point, that the casualties and mayhem caused by terrorist activities have an effect that is disproportionate to the chaos that such incidents create, as such terrorism remains a single most important matter of concern to most nations. Though in reality, causes of people being killed by reasons other than terrorism are much more than what are caused by terrorism – nevertheless, it does not matter since such fatalities do not proffer the political mileage that some country’s search for or guard against. Is it thus safe to conclude that terrorism, as a phenomenon, is a product of international politics and an extension of regular war by other means in pursuit of respective national interests?
4. Pakistan: Susceptible to Terrorism
Pakistan has been labelled as a soft country; in the sense that it accommodates people open to terrorist activity. So why does Pakistan stand out in this phenomenon where it is accused of looking the other way? One needs to go back in time and critically examine events such as the proceedings of the Nuremberg Trials that took place after WW2. There is so much substance in them and even more that explains human behavior. Yet, what stands out most is the plea by the German General Staff, that their only crime was that they were guilty of being defeated. Had they won the war; had they stood where the victors; it would be them questioning the allies on the atrocities that they had committed on their own people. Outrages such as the extermination of the native American Indian, slavery of the black negro and the brutal colonization of Asia and Africa. But Germany had lost the war and having lost it were now guilty of any accusation thrown at them or that they could be blamed for. Pakistan, today, similarly, is equally ‘weak’ just as any vanquished state would be.
Pakistan thus lacks a voice or narrative and stands, vulnerable and susceptible to any kind of accusation – terrorism, extremism, narcotics, child labour, gender discrimination, human smuggling, even if these matters are not as grave as they are generally portrayed to be. Pakistan, is an easy target for coercion, bullying and intimidation – forced to comply with any demands made upon it or then be subjected to further threats, blackmail and accusations. This explanation has not been generated to create sympathy nor is it a justification for how things are. Pakistan is where it is because of its own omissions and commissions and can never be excused for being in the position that it has managed to work itself into.
Pakistan, as a State and as a nation, has never taken governance seriously and lacks capacity, competence and will to implement the law as it should, thus creating a dilemma related to the credibility of its own sovereignty and autonomous capacity as a state. The numerous pulls and pushes, the influences, the movers and shakers, all manipulate a so called governance to do what is best for vested interests. This has now lad to an environment that is highly conducive to intrusion and provides a breeding ground for disruptive violent activity as a political expression, as each party competes to acquire a greater influence in governance, by hook or by crook. In the final analysis, absence of government, as is in most portions of Pakistan, breeds lawlessness the extreme expression of which is terrorism.
A. Evolution of Terrorism in Pakistan
The damning evidence that stares one in the face, pointing towards Pakistan’s guilt is its history of violence. Yet, in Pakistan there is a general perception that terrorism was invented after 9/11, a totally skewed and false perception. Pakistan, from its very inception, was borne of violence itself – death and destruction, where in 1947, an estimated 200,000 people lost their lives to realise a dream that still lies in wait. People like to equate this to some novel and romantic idea of sacrifice for liberty and independence of one’s mother land. For the best part, leaving aside some exceptions, this is not true; these unfortunate people were migrating and had left hearth and home to improve their sorry lot in exchange for a place which had future and a hope for them.
The killings were done by people known to one another, fellow human beings, neighbours, community dwellers, business associates, friends, acquaintances and colleagues, all who were bent on wanton carnage, loot, rape and murder. It was the first instance of an administrative collapse, total lack of organisation and the State apparatus totally missing in provisioning or extending basic protection to the people and establishing law or order. Later, Liaquat Ali Khan, one of the founding fathers of the country, was shot dead in a public rally in 1951. Similar assassinations continued through Pakistan’s history from time to time.
Thus Pakistan is recognised the world over as a violent country. It has, at times been accused, of being a terrorist state and that there is a Low Intensity Conflict being administered through State Sponsored violence all around Pakistan and within. Pakistan never rebuts these accusations through any sophisticated diplomatic counter offensive but instead takes it on the chin – its silence is then generally accepted as validation of guilt.
B. Chronology of Terrorism in Pakistan
In Pakistan’s case, historical data and statistics stand out as glaring evidence indicting Pakistan as a land that is soft on terrorists. The world in general and India in particular never let a moment go by to accuse Pakistan of this violence at every tier, plane and corner of the Globe. The image over the years has developed making Pakistan look like an extremely intense country, plagued with separatism, sectarianism and terrorism. In Pakistan’s case, most of the violence was because of a tentative administration and lack of political will. Weak governments created a vacuum by their absence from administrating the country. This vacuum was then filled up, by criminal gangs and by self-appointed religious groups who started to wield more and more influence.
The new concept of the non-state actor, was also borne leading to the 9/11 incident. This eventually morphed into the trans-national terrorist, who is apparently not connected to any one particular state but was yet supported by some higher order. It further goes on and expands into the new concept of proxy militants, sometimes mercenaries and at other times motivated due to a host of reasons. This allowed nations to wage war against others without being directly involved themselves – Iran and the Hezbollah equation are a good example of this. This allows for a political stand-off space to nations waging war. Pakistan has managed to evolve and encompass all the various shades of extremism and militancy. The historical record of violence and militancy in Pakistan’s context, stands out as a damning testimony and validates the thought, that violence, terrorism and militancy were not discovered in Pakistan only after 9/11. Some major issues pertaining to violence etc. are listed below:
● Blasphemy cases; 189 killed and 30 injured over the years.
● The Language riots in East Pakistan, 1952
● Civil War in East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh, 1971
● Mob violence by Bengalis on non-Bengalis 1970.
● The Baluch Ethno-nationalist Movement, 1948-2007 and continues.
● The Civil War in Baluchistan, 1973-77.
● The Sindhis-Muhajirs Conflict since 1970.
● The Sindhis-Muhajirs Language Riots, 1971-72
● The Pathans-Muhajirs Riots in Sindh, 1985-86
● December 12 to 17, 1986. The Karachi Riots.
● The MQM Versus the Pakistani State and the MQM-Haqiqi 1990
● The Anti-Ahmadi Movement and Riots since 1953 March to date.
● 1974; May 22-29, The Rabwah incident:
● Persecutions against Christians since 1950s.
● The Great Anti-Hindu Pogrom of 1950
● The Hazratbal-inspired Anti-Hindu Pogrom, 1964
● 1988; May 17, The Gilgit Massacre:
● 1992; July: A three-day riot occurred in the NWFP,
● Kurram Agency 1996 September, todate.
● 1997; August 1-10: More than 100 people, mostly Shias, died in sectarian riots during ten days throughout Punjab in an unprecedented wave of sectarian strife, a few days before the anniversary of 50th year of Independence.
● 1998; January 11, The Mominpura Graveyard Massacre: Twenty-five Shias were killed and 50 others injured in Lahore. This event propelled a new wave of sectarian violence resulting in 78 dead and some 80 injured in Punjab, and an estimated 150 in all of Pakistan.
● 1998; March: Twenty-one Shias were killed in Hangu, NWFP, during an attack by Sunni militant organizations.
● 1999; January: Seventeen Shias were killed in Karamdad Qureshi, a small village near Multan. Punjab.
● 2004, March, sunni-shia killings on 10th of Muharram in Quetta, 40 dead.
Note:
These are only some incidents to illustrate the state of violence. Many more have such occurrences have taken place of smaller nature on a routine basis. The matter of violence, terrorism and insurgency was aggravated over time by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and then the US occupation of Afghanistan 1979-2021. This resulted in an influx of refugees as well as militants and the ideology of Jihad.
C. Kashmir, an Illustration of Deceit and Terrorism
The world has numerous flash points that can easily escalate into full-fledged conflicts. Whereas the list of such flash points exist, we will take Kashmir alone, as an illustration. Amongst, many other such volatile issues, one of the most potentially dangerous one is the issue of Kashmir and it should have been a priority in the international scene and the United Nations but it is not. The priority that it should have been accorded is on account of the unprecedented potential of war breaking out between two nuclear capable neighbours: India and Pakistan. Despite being one of the longest outstanding unresolved resolutions, the world has not attached the importance to the matter that it deserves. This is a case of illegal occupation in violation of the 1947 Partition Accords, by India. Over the years, changes to the environment – some natural, others manufactured, have led to arguments justifying India and Pakistan’s respective positions on the conflict. Despite numerous wars for the ‘liberation’ of Kashmir, Pakistan has lost moral ground for not pursuing the matter with a determined effort, while India has lost legal justification by its unauthorised occupation of the land.
Nevertheless, regardless of the arguments, the people of Kashmir still await their right to self-determination and a plebiscite that was promised to them by the world in general and India in particular. Having been deprived of any legal space, political grounds or administrative procedure, the people of Kashmir have been forced to resort to an armed resistance that is now projected as a freedom struggle by one party and terrorism by the other. Indian leaders accuse Kashmiris of terrorism but, in fact, the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948 and other UN declarations, permit people to fight for their right of self-determination. Therefore, the freedom movement of Kashmiris can’t be dubbed as terrorism but that is how the world chooses to see it rather than resolve it. However, as the conflict continues, Pakistan, being a natural beneficiary of the conflict if it is ever concluded successfully, stands accused, wrongly or rightly, of facilitating, aiding and abetting this freedom struggle.
In Pakistan it is widely considered by the public to be a moral right to support the freedom struggle and as such Kashmir remains an important political agenda in domestic politics. India in response to what it sees as Pak-sponsored terrorism in Kashmir, carries out clandestine activities in Baluchistan as a separatist movement and in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) as kind of religiously motivated movement to impose Sharia. In both cases the pattern of violence is reciprocal and considered to be State sponsored. Though it must be noted, that the legal status of the Kashmiri Freedom Struggle under the Fourth Geneva viz. a viz. must be seen in the context of the illegal status of insurgency in Baluchistan, being a separatist movement. In all cases, militancy would not be possible without an aggrieved populace in Kashmir, Baluchistan or some playing the victim card in KP. Historically, India with greater resources and a better institutional cohesion managed to separate East Pakistan, primarily through, what Pakistan sees as terrorism, and what Bangladesh calls a War of Liberation – thus setting a precedent in the region.
However, the conflict in East Pakistan would never have erupted had it not been for the people of the land who felt deprived, disenfranchised and exploited. Thus the first and foremost component of militancy, terrorism, insurgency etc. always revolves around a dissatisfied people who provide the ‘means’ to the ‘ways’ for such conflicts in search of the ‘ends’ that are actually someone else’s national interests. The matter of Kashmir stands testimony to the global indifference towards terrorism or human catastrophe and where such animosities, instead, are exploited and become bargaining chips in multi-lateral relations – all at the altar of respective national interests but always at great human cost in lives, limb and property.
5. Intelligence Agencies and Terrorism
Thus terrorism as a phenomenon must never be simplified, in its explanation as a home-grown based method to madness but, should in fact, be seen as an exploitation of real or perceived grievances only to fulfil political objectives. As illustrated above in the matter of the unresolved resolution of Kashmir, just as many other such conflicts, the world over: like Ireland was and Palestine is. After all, a very good example of the contradiction in labelling any one a terrorist lies in the American War of Independence (1775-1783) which, at that time, was a product of terrorism and insurgency against the British authorities. Thus, the first step to creating an environment conducive to insurgency or terrorism, is by establishing firm positions over the differences created or perceived on the basis of ideology, political disenchantment, economic deprivation, missing equal opportunities or a failed justice system – in fact, always, a product of poor governance and maladministration, before its anything else.
For any exploitation to take place, something as an issue begging to be resolved, must exist in the first place before any exploitation can happen. The issue is discovered, expanded, developed into a movement of sorts and gradually it becomes an all-out insurgency or an act of terrorism. Thus terrorism can very easily be contained and eliminated at its very embryonic stage simply through good governance. Whenever a dissatisfied people exist in far flung areas, external hostile agencies recognise them as an opportunity. States that have a national interest in manipulating the security, foreign or economic policies of another State, gradually apply pressure on the target-government by creating instability, break-down in law and order, chaos on an incremental pattern thus eroding the writ of the government.
This dilemma forces the target-government to negotiate and eventually acquiesce to the demands put before it, finding this to be an easier solution to the crisis. Any State that is vulnerable to such tactics, then develops its own capacity in response, to project similar activities into other states. Thus a strategy is developed to achieve a level of deterrence and containment by extending equitable terrorism to the other states and this evolves into an acquired expertise by intelligence agencies over a period of time.
Intelligence agencies thus compete with one another in the application of chaos and violence all in the interests best served towards their respective national objectives, goals and purposes. It would be unrealistic to expect that any state would restrict and limit its own agencies in pursuing or protecting their own national interests. As such it is equally unlikely that terrorism will ever go away, if this is how wars will continue to be prosecuted into the future; especially when each agency endeavours to outdo the other.
The fact of the matter is that militancy, is never only a home-grown phenomenon, but always an existing grievance exploited by some hostile elements; the role of hostile intelligence agencies in exploitation of an unfortunate environment (created or otherwise) is usually ripe for terrorism that can later be expanded to insurgency, amidst the absence of visible government and the presence of its writ.
6. Pakistan a Vulnerable State
Pakistan is a weak country with extremely poor regulations. Far flung areas have little or no writ of the government and are always susceptible to external influence. The law enforcement elements are incompetent, the bureaucracy is highly corrupt, the justice system is in a near-collapse situation and lacks credibility, the politics does not evolve around the people or the constitution but on individual and personal benefits. Society is divided by sectarianism, parochialism and nepotism, merit is not recognised, equal opportunity does not exist, the economy is mismanaged and depends on international handouts, while the education system is a total farce.
These matters create an environment that is always open to intrusion by external elements who can easily establish their respective influence in matters of ideology, politics, narco-trade, smuggling and crime. Grave anomalies that are relevant to insurgency and terrorism relate to border management, immigration, national digital data pertaining to individual citizenship/identity and terror financing. With such an environment in place, Pakistan’s self-created home-grown vulnerabilities are exacerbated because of its geo-political potential and its nuclear capacity commonly perceived to be an Islamic Bomb (now a product of Islamo-phobia); the former being a quest for international Big-Power Politics to control, influence and manipulate, while the latter is seen as an existential threat that needs to be dismantled as soon as possible – specially to facilitate the former.
Pakistan’s location makes it a place of interest by various competing powers who wish to establish their presence as well as their influence. Its geopolitical position makes it central to the Middle East, China, Central Asia, as well as the Indian Ocean, allowing easy access to these regions. Though its location makes it highly important in the region, yet it also makes it greatly vulnerable, as it is pulled and pushed by greater powers in their bid to establish a foothold so that they can extend their respective power potential, economic activity and political presence in the region. Being a weak State, as already mentioned, Pakistan’s sovereignty is severely compromised as it suffers from a lack of autonomy, due to its dependence on economic support and aid by the international community. Thus Pakistan is easily open to dictation, direction and demands as expressed by respective national interests of other nations. Some of the major issues that are listed as Pakistan’s vulnerabilities are:
A. CPEC
With a continental shelf that extends deep into the Indian Ocean, Pakistan has the potential to control, manage and regulate sea-faring traffic in the Persian Gulf. However, when seen in the context of the Gwader Port, a natural deep sea port, which when completed may be one of the largest in the world, the whole geopolitical framework takes on another dimension. Gwader Port, if and when completed by 2030, will be able to accommodate two x 200, 000 tons’ tankers simultaneously; an unprecedented capacity. It has the potential of handling cargo that will exceed 80 million tons annually thus establishing greater capacity than all Indian ports put together. It is in a position to provide a Victualling Port, greatly facilitating international shipping.
On account of its cargo handling capacity and all the Ports around it, it would make it the largest transshipment port in the region and thus may well be the preferred destination of large cargo vessels. The problem is that Gwader is also crucial to Chinese interests who find it as a strategic alternative to the Malacca Straits, commonly viewed as the Malacca Dilemma. The straits can be closed down by a US led initiative through the collective deployment of the consortium of hostile nations and naval agreements such as the Quad. This sea route lends itself to the passage of 16 million barrels of oil passing through daily and a 100,000 ships carrying cargo annually through it.
However, what is far more important to the world in general and the United States in particular, is that when Gwader is ready with its inland connectivity, it becomes part of the Belt-and-Road-Initiative (BRI) a Chinese initiative to connect Europe, Africa and Asia by land and sea. It implies connecting 2/3rd of the world with about 33 % of the GDP and the US sees this as a threat to its economic ascendency that it enjoys today. Gwader with its infrastructural development and inland connectivity is known as the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). It is a strategic alternative for China to the Malacca Straits and equally important for the US to ensure that it does not become operational.
B. India
Pakistan and India are belligerent States that are likely to remain hostile for some time to come. Whereas Kashmir is the core issue, there are other disputes as well, that would have to be resolved before bilateral relations can ever improve. India considers itself as a regional power with global pretensions and finds itself competing in the region with China.
With Pakistan and China developing strategic commonality, India finds that Pakistan may very well be a Chinese vulnerability. Therefore, engaging Pakistan can disrupt Chinese progress in the region specially along the CPEC route. On the other hand, India has signed a strategic partnership agreement with the US and is becoming more and more aligned with US’s interests.
Since disrupting CPEC and denuclearising Pakistan, has a commonality of interests for India and the US; making Pakistan a common enemy to both.
C. Afghanistan
On Pakistan’s western border, Afghanistan has continually demanded that the Durand Line be revisited and the border be realigned. The international border being labelled as the Durand Line is political jargon designed to confuse the ground reality. Regardless of the unrealistic demand, the matter remains a bone of contention which can always be exploited. Afghanistan is a landlocked country that depends upon Pakistani access to the sea for trade. However, any Trade Transit arrangement is regularly exploited by smugglers which when cracked down upon causes disruption and breakdown in law and order while if allowed to perpetuate, begins to challenge the writ of the government. Afghanistan has been in perpetual civil-war for the last 46 years and has lost all State related cohesion where governance is concerned. Therefore, Afghanistan has become host to militants, terrorist and global non-state actors. With a very porous border between Pakistan and Afghanistan these militant groups can infiltrate and ex-filtrate at will into the neighbouring Pakistani Provinces of KP and Baluchistan. These groups are available on hire and can be exploited on the basis of ideology.
D. Iran.
Though Iran has a conservative Islamic outlook, its brand of ideology conflicts with the Saudi Islamic thought and thus there remains a sectarian divide which is exploited by both: Iran and Saudi Arabia. Both nations, at times contest for space through their proxies in Pakistan creating an internal sectarian conflict. However, Iran has come into a competitive mode related to Gwader and as such is now more aligned towards an Indian point of view. In keeping with Indian interests, Iran has at times interfered in GB and as well as in Khurram agency, exploiting ideological affiliations to promote political instability.
E. Pakistan – a Nuclear State
Pakistan has developed an indigenous nuclear capability in response to India’s nuclear capacity. With a far smaller conventional military capability, a relatively limited defence budget, the situation becomes asymmetric in favour of India. With a continued Indian threat, that is to be seen in the historical context of India’s role in East Pakistan, it is not possible for Pakistan to let its guard down. Thus Pakistan’s nuclear assets are seen as a deterrent, essential for its existence and survival. This then becomes a national red line in keeping with its national security imperatives.
F. Matters of International Interests
Thus Pakistan has a host of sticking points that affect other countries and which can become a cause for animosity and conflict. These are listed as below:
• The US wants Pakistan to distance itself from China and to stop promoting the CPEC project.
• India wants Pakistan to give up its demands on Kashmir and to settle the matter on a status quo basis or to India’s advantage.
• Both India and the US want Pakistan to cap its nuclear capability.
• Iran has shown interests in Balochistan. It has also attempted to promote its ideology through proxies.
• Afghanistan is interested in securing areas along the erstwhile FATA region and relocate the international boundary well within what is now, established, Pakistani territory.
• Smaller issues involve, a US need to see Pakistan improve relations with India but at the cost of China. Also the US wants Pakistan to project hostility towards Afghanistan and provide facilities to the US armed forces to extend military activity into Afghanistan whenever there is a need.
The US also wants Pakistan to be more friendly towards Ukraine at the cost of Russia
(Currently a developing scenario with a degree of fluidity due to the change in the US Regime.)
G. Method to the Madness
Pursuing Political Agendas in Pakistan. In order to force Pakistan to agree with their own goals, the countries already mentioned, pursue their agenda by actions short of war but hostile all the same. Illustration of these activities are as follows:
• Create sectarian polarisation and divide the public. Using assassination, violence, blasphemy laws and street lynching to create chaos and confusion.
• Create space between the public and the armed forces as well as a divide between the senior leadership and the rank and file. To weaken the armed forces, their resolve and negatively affect their morale.
• Create fissures between the political leadership and the armed forces leading to military interference in political affairs thus halting development and progress.
• Fomenting corruption and narco-trade thus destroying bureaucracy and the justice system.
• Dismantling the country’s image, worldwide, and destroying its reputation.
• Exploiting the lack of investment because of the instability created and reaching out to the unemployed and poverty stricken components of society, offering them hope and a new way forward.
• Developing grievances amongst communities by exploiting the incompetence of the government. Structuring narratives suggesting disenfranchisement of the people as a deliberate intent of the government.
• Organising aggrieved communities into militant groups. Providing leadership, cultivating politicians, recruiting fighters for various groups. These groups could be religious groups, political bodies or simply community members demanding justice.
• Equipping, financing, training and directing dissident groups into a harmonised armed resistance with international recognition and moral justification as being freedom struggles, separatist movements or group demanding enfranchisement.
• Organising, planning, coordinating and resourcing terrorist acts to destroy government credibility. Establishing no-go areas and demonstrating relative calm, credible governance and a reliable justice system. This would wean people away from the State in favour of the militants.
• Once the people are won over, to expand the terrorist acts into a full blown insurgency leading to a separatist movement or a civil war.
H. Government becomes the Cause, not the Remedy
In nations where there is polarisation amongst the people based on ethnicity, language, provincialism and sectarianism it is very easy to create volatile political agendas. The unity of the country is threatened and security takes on higher priority than human and individual rights. Laws are twisted to facilitate police action. Democracy is in name only and people of dubious nature enter into the corridors of power.
The whole system gradually gets corrupted. High officials get involved in crime such as smuggling, narco trade and human trafficking. Corruption becomes a way of life and justice is suppressed under the reality of material exchange and benefits. Whereas justice is always a matter of equal dispensation, it must also be interpreted universally for all, with certainty and an equivalent understanding; this is regardless of who is dispensing it and who is suffering or benefitting from it.
Also any form of justice without actual political freedom (real democracy) is tyranny and people will always resist it. Poverty is another factor that is further exploited to manipulate political support and eventually the whole country is held hostage to blackmail, intimidation and lack of a credible justice system. In such an environment militancy begins to take hold, supported by external agencies that exploit the bad governance in vogue and the alternative opportunities it offers. The government, therefore, on account of its omissions and commissions, lends itself in providing the enemy with the most opportunity to create instability within Pakistan. In fact, the government, itself, becomes complicit to the enemy’s manoeuvre by becoming a leading component of such a manoeuvre.
7. Counter Terrorism/In- surgency
With this back drop, explaining the phenomenon of terrorism, one is in a better position to address counter insurgency/terrorism operations. This document has been written with young officers in mind, to provide them a memorandum to help them in understanding and dealing with Low Intensity Conflicts that they are exposed to. Insurgency and terrorism are different in character but very similar in expression, therefore often confused to be as one, whereas both require a very different treatment/solution. The subtle difference lies in the fact that the third and most important player in the equation, ‘the people’ are aligned/sympathetic towards the militants in an insurgency whereas the weight of the public is behind the law enforcement elements in a counter terrorism operation.
What is important to understand is that terrorism, eventually, expands into an insurgency in its next phase when it weans away the people from the government and the militant juxtaposes himself between the people and the State while, he the militant, becomes the spokesman, the liberator and the administrator for the people as a credible alternative to the existing government, thus, completing an important by initial cycle of a successful insurgency. Though policy and planning are discussed at higher level, it is with the express purpose to explain to the young mind what to do when such directions are either missing or are absent, as they often are.
Many a times, young officers look around in confusion trying to determine as to what exactly is the policy and how can they best operate under it but quite often such policy is found wanting. So we can begin by that golden rule, that whereas many young officers may find things not according to their liking or up to their administrative, professional and moral understanding, nevertheless, it’s not their responsibility, to set out and put things in order.
There will always be time enough to do the right thing when one is elevated to such a position oneself and thus one must wait for such a moment or opportunity when it arrives. So as a thumb rule, it is advisable to continue operating as best as one can within the operational framework existing and the command structure that prevails, with minimum compromises to one’s own values, moral conduct or sense of propriety. It is at times difficult but it can be done – a very simple illustration is, when ordered to fire upon an unarmed civilian protest, which appears to be an unjustified order, one may ether refuse to fire (a principled stand) or fire to deliberately miss the target (a more modest stand). The former would lead to career consequences, while the latter, to question one’s competence.
Nothing is being suggested here but what has been expressed was just an illustration – every individual must make a judgement call, by himself, for almost every incident he is confronted with and then be ready to face the consequences of that decision – this is, in fact, what is called real initiative. These are the difficult choices one has to make in the desperate times we are living in. It is sad to see junior officers being forced to make moral judgements on the orders that they must implement but this in itself is the nature of such a conflict. The consequences of an initiative taken by one sub-ordinate could be very different from another and cannot be compared or labelled as precedent.
Different circumstances, such as type of superiors and their outlook, the politicisation of the incident, media management of the activity, and the rationale behind taking a certain decision (self-defence etc.) will define the final outcome. Thus no specific formula or procedure can be stipulated as a guideline and every individual is responsible for one’s own actions as well as one’s conscience. Yet, it is always advisable to resign than to disobey but this again is an individual choice. In light of these contradictions, this study endeavours to address the complicated matters of counter insurgency (CI) and counter-terrorism (CT) and to provide a method and make some sense of it. An attempt to address the confusion such matters undeniably contain are as listed below:
A. How Insurgency or Terrorism Begin
It is crucial to first of all identify the type of problem and its full spectrum. One must clearly differentiate between political protests, workers’ demands, civilian riots etc. from insurgency and terrorism and never confuse these with others. This is important since political and routine protests have different solutions from CI and CT and if treated in a similar manner, would neither address the problem or contain the protest but may even be responsible for the event to morph into an expression of resistance in a different manner – larger, violent and more all-encompassing. For insurgency and terrorism to exist in any environment, instability and breakdown in law and order are the first signatures which are usually an outcome of Government indifference and must be addressed through better policies at the State level. This environment can be recognised by the following signs:
1. The gradual erosion of the writ of the state follows the sequence listed below:
• Complete vacuum, with no or minimal administration. Government is conspicuous by a self-imposed absence. Poor state of law and order, high crime rate and corruption exists.
• People feel disenfranchised, irrelevant to the State and powerless to contribute towards the community or society. Unemployment, crime, bribery and corruption suppress a poverty stricken humanity who remain in search of an alternative to improve their sorry lot.
• A parallel and informal government comes into place and establishes itself within the vacuum created by an indifferent government. The first thing that is done is that an informal justice system is established. The conventional judicial system loses credibility by showing bias, prejudice, fraud and favour. People prefer to turn to the local justice system in place on account of what they see as apparently fair and swift justice dispensed by them. The decisions taken in these ad-hoc courts are then implemented because of the existing militant force available to the courts and which also empowers such a local justice system. These courts demand payments and generate revenue for the services they provide which is given to them willingly by the people.
• The growing influence of the leadership of these militant groups helps them to be recognised as a ‘notable’ of the area and they are so registered in the government books. These leaders are then patronized by the intelligence services and given the defined status of ‘Amman Committees’. They are presented to the authorities as ‘turned’ militants now in favour of the State. These Amman Committees dispense administrative obligations within their respective areas on behalf of the government. They start to pass laws and regulation such as banning barber shops, limiting women education or the visibility of girls in public etc.
• A parallel government is thus established. An arrangement is setup to collect revenue from the people, which sustains the system and justifies the demand on account of providing services to the people. Check posts are established so that vehicles must pay toll. This is done with the tacit approval of the government who further forfeit their own writ to these so called ‘Amman Committees’. Gradually the government’s authority is eroded and it becomes irrelevant, losing its legitimate writ.
• Drug-dealing and smuggling are encouraged and government functionaries are warned to either not interfere or are then are offered illegal gratification from the business. The government becomes a partner at times, when some corrupt officials join the party, making the government themselves complicit in the narco-trade. A contraband bazaar/market comes up and business catches on which includes weapons and vehicles. The biggest client purchasing duty-free smuggled vehicles, from this market is usually the government itself, with the intelligence agencies in the lead. Most senior officials of all departments, acquire such vehicles for their official and private use. The intelligence agencies issue such vehicles with fake registration numbers, that are fraudently documented and registered, to regularize the use of such vehicles. Such a process sets up a totally independent line of business with protected individuals, an influenced NADRA, a corrupted Customs Agency and totally manipulated immigration authority. Smuggling of diesel from Iran is one such glaring illustration, just as, the transportation of drugs down the ‘Heroin Highway’, from Girdi-Jungle (Afghan Border) to the Gwader Coast. The Government becomes an accomplice in every illegal activity beginning from the lower order all the way up to the people in parliament. Channels open that encourage the illegal transfer of funds, human smuggling and the freedom of travel, accommodation, providing a conducive environment in enhancing the liberty of action for terrorist organisations.
• A new leadership is thrown up which is usually a product of petty crime and has no recognised lineage, tribal standing or historical relevance within the tribes. Illegal wealth, a product of clandestine businesses is then regulated by the local leadership who, besides, imparting justice also start employing people on various jobs expanding the surreptitious business activity that the community now gets involved in and becomes integral to. The people see this leadership as the representatives of the government and attributes everything that they do, or not do, to government policy. It is this leadership that the government also deals with and it is they who set the terms to maintain some semblance of peace as they go about their business. Mangal Bagh, the bus conductor from Khyber is one such luminary, while Gul Bahader, another character of North Waziristan, stands out as a good example of how the intelligence sleeps with the enemy. Yet, numerous examples of this kind can be listed since many more such characters exist. The process affectively puts the local community under the influence of selected people of dubious credentials while the government surrenders the local communities to the likes of Sufi Muhammad of Swat without a qualm or regret on the dubious pretext of ‘giving peace a chance.’
• The group’s recognition grows, the leader encourages and extends his hospitality to outsiders in search of space. He gives audience to foreigners, accepts funds from outside sources and is cultivated by hostile agencies. His movement within the country and out is facilitated by the corrupt immigration system and, transfer of funds are done regularly, through dubious channels. He manages to acquire total freedom of movement and liberty of action – intimidating anyone who is honest upright or uncompromising.
2. The militant groups then expand their organisation through employing unemployed youth or press gang youngsters from villages ensuring representation from each family. Such induction begins to increase as the communities give up their youth under sever intimidation, and the rank and file of the militants, swell. As the reputation of individual militants grow; they either establish their own group or then get affiliated to a larger group, leading to Chapters, i.e. Swat Chapter, Bajaur Chapter etc. while actually being affiliated to the TTP, making the TTP a much larger establishment than it actually was. The militant groups then begin to work in tandem and with total coordination, as follows:
• The group facilitates low level intelligence operators, allowing them to infiltrate their own group and then manages to turn them against their own organisation. These turned intelligence people are then used to influence the intelligence system; threatening of attacks at some place, misinforming at other places. This at times leads to ambushes and entrapment of military personnel or giving an exaggerated picture about militant standing, strength and capacity. The intelligence then paints their association with such people as a personal achievement establishing a false credibility. This allows them the space and a chair at the decision-making table to influence tactical and operational decisions. They, in fact, secure a place in the system as sympathisers for the militants and begin to represent the cause of the militants becoming their political face.
• Eventually these militant groups extend their services to main stream political groups, developing their militant cells and acquire a political front to further their agenda. They manage to acquire a legitimacy and relevance to the overall national structure. Mullah Aziz of the burqa fame is a good example.
• Soon these groups become autonomous and the intelligence agencies who were handling them lose control of them. They then set their own agendas and put the government into very difficult, and at times, in an embarrassing situation. Jaish is one such erstwhile group just as Dawa was another, which invariably leading to failure in the States capacity to regulate, control and manage such groups. MQM and MQM(H) is a good example – militant groups turned into political entities and then set one upon one another.
9. Policy (State Level)
The first step to contain and eradicate insurgency or terrorism from the country is to structure a policy at the national level. It is very easy to say such a thing but what must be understood is that the policy has to be a product of the overall status of the environment i.e. stable governance and politics in the country. To arrive at such a conducive situation would become impossible to explain in this discourse, since it would go into the body politics of the country. It would, thus suffice, to state that the CI and CT policies are an outcome of settled political issues and a stable environment. We move on, with the caveat that the country, empirically, has a ‘popular government, the State institutions are stable and functional, governance is generally good’. Taking it from here, one must understand that internal security, of any kind, is never a product of political agenda as much as it is of a permanent policy, albeit, subject to change as a consequences of periodic updating.
It is a matter of National Security and needs to be addressed at that level. Pakistan is notorious for being a country that has never believed in policies and instead functions on temporary whims based on who is in power at the time. If this flexible attitude is not settled first, then what ever this paper might document about CI/CT will remain a hypothetical exercise. So given that one day Pakistan may finally see the Government it deserves, we move on to CI/CT measures that are recommended for further consideration and implementation:
A. People Driven
Policy is a set of ideas and plans that guide decisions. In a democracy, no policy can be structured and hope to succeed without the consent of the majority people. In fact, the government of the day, is a product of that majority. The first and foremost guiding principle in framing policy related to CT and anti-terrorism would be the Constitution. Thus in Pakistan, Article 4 through to Article 38, of the Constitution, would have to be consulted before enacting policy. These articles must be the premise of any CI/CT Document. It must be ensured that no Article related to individual, collective or community human rights are violated and it is should be clearly understood, that if they are violated, the matter would become a rational for worsening an already bad situation, rather than even remotely, addressing it. Thus the People and their Constitution are sacrosanct to any State Policy. The objective of any State Policy, before it, should clearly define, how every law, every decision and every act is a product of the ‘wellbeing of the people’ first and foremost.
B. Institutionalised Approach
The State must establish institutions to manage, deal with terrorism in all its facets. We in Pakistan have the revised National Action Plan 2021, (NAP) with its 14 points and the National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), both of which are dysfunctional and totally irrelevant to the prevailing environment. The State needs to re-establish and implement the NAP based policy as well as make NACTA functional as an institution, totally independent and empowered. Such an institution must be autonomous and strongly protected from being politicised. The operational reach must go beyond the usual routine bureaucratic red-tapism as well as be insulated from the influence of political, intelligence agencies and military official higher-ups. It must have the capacity to implement their counter-terror plans after the necessary approval by the government and based on a defined policy (NAP). NACTA must have total synergy with authorities in the judiciary, immigration, customs and police. It must have its own dedicated intelligence system and air, ground and naval components. The already proposed organisation has already been constructed on paper etc. but awaits being fully developed and implemented and it is hoped that if it ever does come on ground, that the original concept should neither be truncated nor modified so as to reduce its capacity and capability. Because such plans are already lying stagnant in the pipeline, no more time will be spent in this document describing such an organisation.
C. Fusion Cells
The Government needs to set up Fusion Cells all over the country. These must have data links and feeds with the police, traffic, weather, economy, market highs and lows, agricultural inputs, prices etc. The intent is to record data about events occurring, when, why and how so that a reference archive is always available. The purpose of the fusion cell is to gather sufficient data to develop an early warning system and predictive warning device informing the authorities of the likelihood of an incident likely to take place based upon relative analysis of the unusual from the usual, leading to a course of action. It would also help the government in managing and controlling day to day routine events based on data collation. A digital collation of data would go a long way in helping the analysis to develop useful conclusions.
D. Politics
The State must develop a zero tolerance towards extremism, violence and militancy. The first step would be to disarm the groups that notables move around with. Everyone should be protected by the government and not private guards. Whereas this paper is not intended to discuss political issues, nevertheless, it must be understood that good governance is the first step towards prevention of armed resistance. The State must identify far flung areas, destitute communities, and people who appear to be abandoned or neglected. Such areas and people must be engaged positively. Education for all, employment, skill training, emancipation of women, will go a long way in managing good governance. Local Bodies must be empowered and allowed to implement small town-related decisions so as to bring in people participation. The CPLC is a good institution which can be extended down to district level and empowered suitably. Police reforms must be undertaken as soon as possible with the institution being depoliticised totally, making them a self-governed body, autonomous and protected from the political influence.
E. State Conduct
The state apparatus, i.e. the bureaucracy, police, administration, judiciary and other law enforcement agencies, must communicate with the dissidents by first accepting them as their own countrymen. The following approach must be taken:
• Learn about the dissidents, their people and leadership.
• Invite them to talk. Identify genuine problems and differentiate between these and other politicised demands.
• Listen to the people, their complaints and their views with patience and tolerance. Widely present the demands of the protesters nation-wide so that everyone knows what they are demanding. Give them time on air to express their grievances. Ensure suitable responses are prepared, not necessarily challenging their view but rationalising the State’s position and a way forward.
• Broaden the canvas of discussions by involving more people so that demands are not limited to benefits for the leadership alone and are widely publicised.
• Opportunity and development based corrective measures must be offered. Political relevancy must be established. Its best to let the dissident/ protesters select a committee for implementation of any plans arrived at.
• Bring up issues about foreign interference and support by enemy/hostile agencies. Ensure the discussion shows understanding that the nexus between the dissidents and the foreign agency occurred because the dissidents had no alternative and no one to turn to. Offer the States services in this regard as a ‘credible’ alternative.
• Understand the difference between acquiescing under pressure and accommodating the opposition in sincerity and generosity. The latter is always counterproductive while the latter is long-lasting.
• Whatever agreements are arrived at, ensure that complete transparency, visibility and participation of the people is guaranteed. Be careful of new precedence being established that can become nation-wide demands by others; though if genuine, then even those can be accepted.
F.
Such negotiations/discussions are never about the Sate surrendering and nor is there any occasion where a State can surrender to its own people. This is simply because the State must always be seen as already subordinated to the people. However, there should be no compromise on the matter of law or the justice system, which should be equal for all. It is important that the State must always appear to be standing with the people and never against them. Narratives must be structured accordingly. Yet there are cases where a vested leadership has been induced to work against the State and thus carries the people into a more rigid agitation and a violent disposition leading to terrorism/insurgency. The State must be prepared for such an eventuality as well and confront it with political will and a determined outlook.
G. Media
The media is now considered to be the fourth pillar of the State. It must be autonomous and independent. Free flow of information is the best intelligence gathering tool and a very accurate measure of what the people want. Media in Pakistan is staffed by very incompetent and poorly educated people, this must improve through healthy competition and international exposure.
The English language media needs to be developed so as to help build the national image at a global level; by carrying the correct narratives opposed to hostile propaganda campaigns world-wide. It must be kept in mind that most agitation is started by conspiracy, rumour and false notions.
These can be addressed by a media that is mature and credible and that the people believe in. Vacuum of information and absence of credible media cells offers an opportunity to the enemy to fill the vacuum with hostile propaganda, shaping opinions and manufacturing narratives detrimental to the State.
H. Tourism
The State has the potential to encourage tourism and with tourism a substantial contribution can be made to the national exchequer as well. Tourism allows for a better image of the country, procedures develop that facilitate in local administrative management, i.e. garbage collections, better roads, improved hospitality business, more employment, better communication and enhanced security systems. Thus integrating the country with the world community insulates the local communities from unnecessary hostile defamation as well as their exploitation on account of a lack in awareness or not having been exposed to universal customs and conduct.
10.
Since this paper is not intended to discuss better methods to governance or how politics should be implemented, it would suffice to conclude, that without a stable country and a people who have hope in their future, an environment conducive to intrusion and hostile intrusive tactics, will always remain open-ended.
Thus, it is with this thought in mind that it is very strongly recommended that in order to contain terrorism, one must put his own house in order. As explained earlier, hostile agencies are always on the lookout for communities that are dispossessed, disenfranchised or neglected and it is these communities that provide opportunity to these agencies. It makes sense, that instead of fighting these agencies in a war of their choosing, it would be far better to deny them that environment of intrusion through good governance. Besides, no counter terrorism steps, methods or plans can succeed with a poorly governed region where inequality exists, justice is not available and opportunity for development is non-existent.
11.Strategy, (Federal Government and NACTA)
Note:
This document is written in light of the current situation in which the military has the lead role only because NACTA is dysfunctional. As such most of the procedural matters and recommended steps apply to the military as it exists today.
However, the same may be applied to NACTA when and if, it ever comes on ground as a functional entity. Neverthe less, it ought to be understood that this document, strongly suggests that the military must be insulated from any public dealing and must never be made to suffer the consequences of a civil-military misunderstanding and other animosities.
NACTA when fully functional is expected to have the wherewithal in terms of resources and manpower down to the provincial and district level which would probably be constructed through a rotational secondment of military formations.
It is further visualised that these formations would be made up from new raisings to make up for the deficiencies caused by the secondment within the military rank and file. The new raisings would be funded by the ministry of interior and NACTA would be placed under command the Ministry of Interior for its routine functions and operations. However, during war, the operational force of NACTA and its equipment would fall under military command for tasking, employment and deployment.
A. Lead Role – Political
The federal Government’s strategy must flow from resolutions tabled in the Parliament and must never be independent of these. Resolutions related to national security must be a product of informed debate and discussion. Expert opinions must be taken into consideration related to threat and response as various opinions are voiced. These must be heard on mass media, seminars, institutions and a public buy-in must be structured. After arriving at a popular public sentiment, the Parliament should debate the matter and conclude the debates by determining the threat and the response. The response should must always be phased with the non-violent phase always getting the lead role.
Even though in the early stages of terrorism, the people must be secured against the perpetrators of violence, who through their action intend to intimidate the people and force them to abide by their own rules; such as laws pertaining barbers and education of girls etc. Thus Parliament should nominate a committee of people relevant to the region where a threat is expected or is imminent.
The Committee should be tasked to reach out to the people who are trying to cause chaos and disharmony and make their grievances public. If such complaints are genuine then to address their grievances through negotiated settlements, development programmes, provision of opportunities in employment, welfare and community security.
The government must ensure that the local leadership is given a lead role in any agreements and must be empowered to provide the necessary leadership in such circumstances. If the environment has deteriorated beyond the stage of negotiations and the local leadership has been sidelined or incapacitated, then a different approach needs to be considered. Where usurpation of the local leadership by force has taken place by an alternative militant leadership then the law-enforcement elements should be tasked to reinstate the status quo and to improve the environment so that negotiations are facilitated once again with the recognised leaders of the area.
What is extremely important is that being strategy, it must examine the ‘ways, means and ends’, clearly specifying all. The means needed to handle the crisis must be clear to all and arranged accordingly otherwise one could very easily get involved into a conflict-of-attrition, the very purpose of insurgency/terrorism. It is strongly recommended that a separate budget be setup to handle the crisis so that nothing is diverted from the routine functioning of the State. The focus on an insurgency situation should be progressive, incremental and graduated as follows:
• Prevent the situation into deteriorating from simple terrorism into an insurgency. This is best done through a political process and addressing the grievances of the people. Gather intelligence and focus on intelligence based precision oriented law enforcement directed against the hostile leadership. Never make a miscreant into a martyr or a hero.
• Deter terrorism by speedy response to any law and order situation. Government must be prepared with credible information, should be aware of the situation and its gravity, must engage the people in communal activity and market routine functions. A suitable narrative, widely and appropriately publicised to be issued using the media etc. Put up complaint cells for the people to come to and register their problems.
• Contain it when it starts to expand and isolate the areas that are more susceptible to terrorism or where insurgency is beginning. Ensure such areas are under virtual siege related to supply of fuel, medicines and food. The government must ensure that the people are regularly supplied with regulated daily necessities in an organised manner and fully accounted for.
• Eliminate any unconstitutional or anarchical practices by use of force but whenever found feasible, re-establish the political process as soon as possible. Ensure the participation of the people in most activities to be undertaken. Integrate the people in the security plans.
• Sustain stability through good governance and enforcing the law. Continuity, reliability, security and certainty are the key components of sustaining success in counter terrorism operations.
B. Military Conduct
At times, a region’s system of government is corrupted beyond the stage of it being a credible medium to engage the people. The signatures in such a region are corruption, narcotics, smuggling, crime, dacoits, militancy. Here when the process is no longer possible through political engagement and can only be resolved through a physical confrontation, then the Parliament must first declare political failure and then invoke Article 245 or the Judiciary invokes Article 190, whichever is more suited. The situation is handed over to the Law-enforcement/military.
The Military commander sets up a headquarter in the area and develops a political wing with the help of the existing bureaucracy, i.e. including the secretary interior, immigration official, customs representative, anti-narcotic control, NADRA etc. They must set up an intelligence wing and all intelligence units are integrated into this to develop one homogeneous picture rather than compete with one another to report first and accurately only to their own respective higher-ups – this is not a career opportunity.
Any other administrative body that is required should be requisitioned by the military command. The military commander must ensure synergy in application and each component must be integrated with the overall plan working towards a unified objective. The military then should report regular progress to the Political Committee who can update the Parliament. The strategy needs to define methods in controlling spaces, capturing or eliminating hostile leadership, securing the people and present a plan for creating an environment that is conducive to restart the political process.
The headquarters established for the purpose of CI/ CT/ should be joint and involve both civilians as well as military. The leadership should be flexible switching from civil control to military control as per the dictates of the environment, i.e. as the response switches from a political application to a military one and vice versa. The headquarter established would also develop the hierarchy and channels of command to the provinces with a parallel communication system, one to the provincial military command (Corps) and the other to the Provincial Political leadership (Chief Minister).
Orders have to be clear and must be in writing to include the Objectives and the desired End State.
C. External Manoeuvre
The Government must take note of any external intrusion in the form of funding and resources etc. These must be highlighted through the media. The foreign office to be kept up to date on events and a proper theme with an appropriate narrative to be formulated for broadcasting. Only one agency nominated by the Government to handle the story. Foreign press to be invited and embedded into the conflict zone. Judicial closure to the captured individuals should be forthcoming, transparent and conclusive.
International bodies such as the United Nations as well as the Human Rights Organisations must be engaged. Diplomatic offensive to be planned and stage-managed by the Government against the belligerent country conducting hostile act. Own premier intelligence agencies must be able to take the conflict into enemy territory rather than do defensive operations inland only. Measures must be ensured that wide publicity is given to the events to prevent rumours. Motivational and inspirational themes to be developed so as to convince the people of one national narrative.
12.Operational (Provincial and Corps Level)
The Chief Minister must hold a series of apex committee meetings where the instruction of the higher command is read, analysed and understood. An operational plan to be formulated involving political reconciliation, failing which, military action to create a suitable environment for a political understanding to take place. The following steps must be adhered to:
A. Political Initiative
The Commissioner and DC offices must be activated by integrating the general public at all levels. The local leadership must be integrated into the civil administration’s working thus bring a connectivity with the people. The affected region must have a dedicated and around the clock complaint cell which should be people friendly. It must allow for complaints by the people that they commonly have, i.e. electricity, gas, water, property, police, courts etc. These complaints must be taken very seriously and addressed. The Commissioner/DC involved must hold a monthly open kutchery and have his staff read out the complaints and the action taken or not taken. The system allows for connectivity between the people and the government and as such the people do not feel neglected. The other important issue is related to setting up an FM Station in the region.
Though it is recommended that this be done anyway everywhere but in case it has not been done, to establish one at the earliest. The FM Station must have a dial-in system and allow people to call in to register their opinion, complaints or suggestions. The focus should be mainly the women of the area who cannot leave their homes easily. The subject-matter must be related to domestic violence, food, health, house and garden and entertainment etc. It must not broadcast Naats, moral education and religious themes since these exist and have already lost their appeal to affect community behaviour. A people’s opportunity building and development programme must be structured with the people’s involvement where the local leadership is present in the decision making and accord priorities to these projects. These must be widely circulated and information must be passed to all.
The local bodies (Nazim’s Office) must be constructed along the town-hall style system. Regular public meeting of the Nazim’s office must be held open to all – televised and covered fully to be transparent and free of any controversy. Funding in the region should be declared for public information and expenditure should be regularly printed in the local newspaper. Focus on health and education is extremely important. Registering crime, reporting it and containing it, is of even greater importance. Justice must be dispensed equally to all. Taking such measures can easily contain most insurgencies or even reverse them, however, in some cases where foreign intrusion has made headway, it is important for the Law-Enforcement elements to step in and engage the militants in selected operations that create the right effects, defining a future course, for a political settlement.
B. Military Posture
The military application in such circumstances is always a difficult proposition. The first and foremost matter that must govern military operations is that the military must never become an occupation army. The second important matter to keep in mind is that the military invariable enters a region for the stated objective of protecting the people but invariably begins to protect themselves more than the people themselves. The formations and units begin to impose restrictions on the people that appear to be an act of self-preservation such as shutting down roads, building walls and setting up bunkers that creates an inconvenience to the people. Such an attitude is always counterproductive and not only reduces the credibility of the military but also puts in a distance between the people and the military.
The third counter-productive step usually taken is to introduce a culture of inquiries – to examine an incident, to appropriate blame and to determine the cause of it. To analyse any military engagement/accident discreetly for the information of the command is one thing, but to do so with intent to punish someone, in these circumstances is entirely wrong and is self-defeating. When undergoing training during collective outdoor/field manoeuvres, inquiries are dispensed with in minor accidents, breakages or damage to equipment etc. with such incidents simply written-off as attributable to training.
As such, it is hard to imagine, or find justification in holding inquiries in an operational environment. The culture of inquiries robs the institution of initiative, while CI/CT fall into the realm of the young leader’s domain. These are usually platoon and company employments, but, with strategic connotations and the young men leading in these operations need to be protected but must also have a sense of being protected. This does not at all suggest that large scale reverses such as the APS incident of 2014 etc. should not be inquired into. Such big reverses must be properly analysed and commanders found wanting to pay for the consequences of their negligence. Some of the main issues at the operational level that must be addressed are:
• Written operational orders must be issued with clarity with the Commander’s personal signatures. Activity undertaken must be as a consequence of a firm order given that is neither deniable nor ambiguous. The Operational Orders must specify the objectives that have to be achieved, the time frame in which that they need to be completed and the effects that are being solicited by these operations. Tenures of various commanders, at times, must be tied to the completion of the task specified. It has often been seen that senior commanders dilly dally about after having received some kind of instruction, avoid undertaking the task at hand and await their transfer from the conflict zone leaving the matter for someone else to address.
• The Rules of Engagement are a very important matter and must be specified in writing as part of the operational orders. This is to avoid unnecessary bureaucratic red-tapism, thus, delaying a suitable response or then making it necessary for individuals to look over their shoulder for every action they need to undertake. The Rules of Engagement must address dealing with hostile militancy when individually confronted with, as well as in, where an individual comes across militant activity not directly confronting him but an event within the vicinity that warrants his attention. Rules of Engagement must prioritise the safety of the individual soldier, his equipment and the civilians in the vicinity.
• The Corps Headquarters to arrange and coordinate flash short-duration education classes for young officers as well as soldiers. These classes can be conducted by a mobile education workshop visiting unit areas for three to four days each. The classes must address what the militant ideology is, what are the militant’s objectives, why is he fighting, what do the people think, what should the people be told, what do our own values, ideology and moral standing, describe, define and state about the militant point of view etc.
• The under command formations and units must be given a code for various stages of alert, i.e. observation, intelligence gathering, patrolling, physical operation to secure and control spaces etc. This is so that the fluctuating levels of operations should always be tied in with possibility of a political reconciliation, where and when it is possible.
• Visibility of commanders in the forward area is extremely important. It provides accessibility. Good commanders find time to live amongst the troops for limited times, i.e. two to three days, living like the troops and eating like they do.
• The commanders own direct informal inter-action with the troops and young-officers establishes a good measure of the moral, takes into account of any minor problems faced by the troops and gives the troops access to the command for speedy correction of small administrative irritants. It also makes the Institution more cohesive, sustains esprit de corps, allows commanders to evaluate and understand the ground situation as it actually is, better than simple reports. Care must be taken that such visits by senior commanders do not become an administrative burden for the sub-ordinate formations/units or call for unnecessary protocol regimes.
• Interaction with the rank and file must be undertaken as frequently as possible. The views of the troops as well as the young officers must be taken into consideration and at times addressed or then suitably responded to.
On no account should rumours etc. be allowed to foster. Occasional moral raising events should be organised for the troops during the lull periods if any. Leave, recreation time and rest must be organised for all and be a certainty. Rotation plans for units and formations must be specified and scheduled with all propriety and implemented.
C. Press Handling
The press should be handled by the civilian counter parts and not the military. However, press conferences and talks to be jointly prepared. Arrangements to take reporters to the conflict zone should be a regular affair. Interaction with civilians in the area with the press is important and their story must be told and allowed to be widely publicised.
D. Judicial System
There is a serious need to bring in judicial reform leading to a more home grown judicial system that is people friendly. The provincial government to arrange for judicial closure to those captured or detained during the conflict.
The proceeding must be transparent, open and within the constitutional and existing legal system. For those High Value individuals apprehended, to be handed over to the premier intelligence institutions for interrogation with a clear caveat that they must never become assets of the intelligence and be returned to the conflict-zones as government representative; (as is being often resorted nowadays). Officers of the formation must be furnished with a suitable pamphlet on domestic as well as international law related to CT and Anti-Terrorism Operations.
Universals terms should be understood by all and used in communications, i.e. terrorist, militant, civil-war, war, separatists, insurgency. No terms should ever be used that can be exploited in hostile narratives on account of legal terms.
E. Discipline
A strict adherence to the law to be ensured during operations and no extra-judicial/constitutional activity to be undertaken under any circumstances. There is no quicker way for the military to lose its credibility in a given area than by doing things that are not recognised by the law.
Property and valuables of the people must be protected where ever possible. Collateral damage to be kept to the bare minimum. To destroy an innocent citizen’s house while engaging a hostile militant is criminal and must be avoided at all cost.
The usual justification of the people being used as ‘human shields’ by the militants thereby causing loss of life to ordinary people is an unacceptable act undertaken by any professional military. Methods in how to handle such situations and training for such events must be organised at a regular basis.
F. Refugee Control
It must be kept in mind that these operations are not an invasion of enemy territory but are small military actions undertaken to secure spaces and provide protection to one’s own people. They are temporary in nature and short termed, undertaken for the barest necessary minimum time. Their only objective should be to create political space within the region to facilitate reconciliation.
As such the people must be given the greatest importance and must be made to feel that they are the main focus of the government; that it is for them that these military operations are being undertaken. Thus refugee control, and management is an extremely important part of the whole campaign that should be properly planned and executed. The Provincial Government must earmark suitable areas for refugees. The volume of refugees, their movement, gender and children etc. to be anticipated through the civil administration. Tent villages must be organised in designated areas. The villages must account for the following:
• Residential areas for families with hygiene in mind. Arrangements for running potable water. The accommodation to provide suitable privacy to each family. A coordination cell to be organised where queries can be addressed or assistance given.
• Suitable transport to be organised for the carriage of the refugees to designated camps. These must include ambulances for each convoy. The convoys to be appropriately accompanied by coordinators and police.
• Each camp must set up basic health facilities and schools for the children.
• Basic-needs market to be established for routine purchases by the refugees such as food items, fuel and routine groceries.
• Each family be issued with a ‘Smart Card’ by a designated bank. Each card to be charged with sufficient cash to sustain the family for a month.
• The Camps must arrange for organised sports and provide for a women’s meeting place where regular interaction by the women is possible.
13. Tactical Actions (Commissioner/DC and Division/Brigade Levels)
Operations undertaken at the regional level, i.e. administrative divisions and district would be done so at the military formation level, that is the infantry division or the brigade level. It is imperative that the leadership involved, civil as well as military, undertakes a detailed study as soon as possible about the history of the region. A thorough understanding of the terrain, demography, any existing conflicting ideologies, ethnicities and their influence, trade, agriculture and traffic, has to be arrived at. Important data to be collected, e.g. number of flour mills in the area and what tonnage of flour is either refined or transported under normal circumstances.
Other food items such as sugar etc. also to be taken into account. Any unusual food activity, its refinement, storage or sales is a clear indicator that it is being supplied to an extra-ordinary customer and not the regular one. Similar records/data to be analysed related to abnormal hiring of hired accommodation, excessive sale of fuel, unusual traffic in any particular area. Frequent meeting with the notables of the region should be encouraged, their views, advise or opinion be taken into consideration. It is always a good idea to empower the local leadership and let them establish order and regular functioning within communities. Village Defence (VD) concept is not a bad idea and usually the intelligence discourage the practice since it reduces their own mandate/authority. The VD can set up check-posts in their respective village areas, record movement of people etc. and ensure limited movement at night.
They should be equipped with proper communication facilities and a central station must be established to get periodic situation reports on a fixed time basis. An over-watch of a mobile patrol to ensure no high handedness is done by these check posts in the name of the Government or the military. Manning check posts by the military must be avoided and where local people, i.e. VDs are not available, it should be done by the Police. The military as well as the FC must never be physically affiliated with these check posts because there is a tendency for the Police to blame the military for demanding bribes/money etc. Establishing a Central Check Post (CCP) manned by the military as a hub for all other check posts in relative areas would be helpful for its supervisory capacity and it could also be a complaint cell for the local community against any untoward behaviour of the general check posts. The CCPs could also collate information collected from the check posts related to traffic, movement, passage of goods and people. The CCP is then a good position to validate and orientate the context of the collated information against the areas routine day-to-day functioning. The tactical plan constructed at this juncture must include the following essential points.
A. The Tactical Orientation
Having assessed the overall situation and the environment and taken into consideration what the defined objectives are, the commander must come up with a plan designed and tailored for the specific region that he is operating in. This must include:
• Is the region to be primarily controlled through limiting/restricting movement within it?
• Should control be undertaken by clearing spaces and holding them, through tactical actions and later deployments?
• Will the area require to be isolated from other neighbouring regions?
• How should the militants be prevented from making contact with the local communities?
• Should it be a combination of all of the above or some of the above?
• Should there be a graduated approach and an incremental application in a deliberate attempt at escalating the conflict or containing such an escalation and why would it be necessary?
• What weather would suit offensive operations and which would help in holding ground?
• Intelligence plan.
• Communication network to be established on duplicate basis. Militant communication must be intercepted and recorded, collated, analysed and archived. Along with these, other routine reports and returns such as war diaries, signal logs, daily situation reports, etc. must be documented, recorded and filed for post operation analysis and post-mortem of the overall conduct.
B. Allocation of area
The formation must distribute the entire space of the conflict amongst the under-command units/battalions with defined posture and boundaries:
• The space should be divided into different categories, i.e. Intense combat areas, regulated spaces and areas under observation and physical-watch. The first is self-explanatory, the second is where check points and road movement is controlled while the third is where law-enforcement presence is on alert and ready but is at the time only observing traffic movement, the market activity and accommodation for rent etc.
• Selected areas central to the overall regions in different extremities must be marked as Formation Administrative Areas or Division Administrative Areas (FAA/DAA). These areas are staging areas and provide a hub for the units that must pass through it. The area is suitably protected and must have the area’s reserves stationed in it, that is, if they have not been employed at the time. Troops passing through must be part of the area defence while they are staging through.
• The FAA is also the road-head hub for the unit’s dependent on it and all beyond it must be authorised by a central-control only. This is by allocation of a control number or any other suitable method, with vehicular movement recorded, defining purpose, destination, timing and personnel involved. Degree of caution to be imposed on vehicular movement to be decided here and in keeping with the level of alert.
• Road opening days/timings etc. to be exercised from this point beyond depending upon the situation. No unregulated movement of single vehicles or casual traffic should be allowed.
• The FAA is also the logistic hub for that specific area and hold stocks of rations, water-point if necessary, ammunition and petroleum oils etc.
• The FAA is also the staging area for refugees and the em-bussing point for their travel towards designated camps.
• The FAA holds the field hospital and the workshop.
• Newly inducted units go through their basic steps before induction in the FAA and those units departing undertake stock-taking here and stay overnight before departure.
• The FAA is invariable where the guns are positioned unless in some rare cases the forward positons are so far forward that the guns have to be directly attached with some battalion. If the FAA is correctly sighted, the need for deploying artillery into forward localities would be a very unusual matter.
• The FAA also must have arrangement for establishing a forward air controller, and be able to accommodate a flight of attack helicopters and a couple of MI 17 transport helicopters on a required basis.
C. Allocation of resources
The formation must allocate combat and support resources in keeping with the task.
• These include resources such as aviation units. Fixedwing aircraft for recce and rotary wings for transportation, logistics and combat. (In recce missions, the altitude level must be defined by the field commander, i.e. the usual height for administrative, logistic or transport flights is about 6000 feet to avoid ground fire but recce flights higher than 1000 feet are counterproductive and do not serve the purpose.)
• The guide line for ammunition stocking for an operation is one fixed-line with the battalion, two fixed lines on wheels in the FAA, and three fixed-lines reserved at the depot; however, this can vary depending upon the intensity of the conflict. It is often felt that the field commanders are being excessive in their demand but it is always better to err on the side of being over-prepared than not. Restrictions on expenditure of ammunition or on a specific type of ammunition if the demand is within the basic estimates, is an immediate contradiction of policy and strategy. These estimates are worked out as the cost-of-war with a 20% provisioning over it, for the untoward. If at that time, during the planning stages, it is discovered that the operation cannot be suitably supported and that the cost of war cannot be met, then one should not embark on such an operation.
• Other allocations made by the formation are mechanised elements such as tanks, personnel carriers, missiles and Hired Military Transport (HMTs).
D. Logistics
The day to day expenditure of food, water, ammunition and causalities must be estimated. This would lead to conclusions related to the requirement of transport, when it is needed and where it is needed. The most economical use of empty vehicles on their return journey should be also a consideration in such a logistic plan. Units being inducted, must be advised to submit the ‘blood-grouping’ of the personnel and the formation medical unit to collate and be prepared to administer necessary medical support when and if needed.
E. Drone coverage
Drones are now an integral part of any military manoeuvre and a special cell must be set up to manage the drones allocated to the formation. The cell should be self-contained and mobile so that it can establish itself within any of the units/battalions to provide the necessary support. Drone operations must be classified as information gathering/intelligence operations, early warning flights to scan the are in support of own troop movement, ambush operations targeting militant movement, precision operations designed to target high value targets and the leadership.
F. Use of Air Force
Using air force must be kept to the bare minimum since the implications of it usually upgrades the level of the conflict from an insurgency to a civil-war scenario. Nevertheless, if and when used, a suitable narrative must be framed for its justification and the public to be informed through a sensible press conference. The use of air is usually responsible for high levels of collateral damage and thus selecting targets should be done with great care and professional understanding.
G. Intelligence
This conflict is one which is undertaken, more often than not, on intelligence based information and as such, intelligence has a very important role in it. However, our own intelligence has not been very effective because of the following reasons, parallel commands destroy the unity of effort and each intelligence operator is more concerned about his own superiors in the chain, rather than the field command. Second, the intelligence units begin to compete with one another for higher recognition and at times work at cross purposes. Thirdly, plain incompetence, poor training and lack of capacity has limited the role of the intelligence in the field. Remedial measures are that all intelligence units must be placed under the respective field formations for the duration of the operation.
An intelligence brief to the commander must be delivered collectively every morning or whenever it suits the commander. The field formation must work out a tasking format and issue a proper objective sheet to the intelligence units operating. The field formation must also establish its own integral intelligence by interacting with the notables of the area, the community in general, the traders and the farmers. Regular patrol reports received from the units/ battalions must be collated at the formation level and analysed. The VD system to be integrated into the intelligence working. The concept of the so called hang-around security needs to be revisited.
Putting soldiers in plain clothes and having them stand around the markets/crowded areas may sound like an amazing initiative but it looks equally foolish to the locals who can recognise all who are not from the area, specially a military man, someone, who has no idea of the local customs (ravaj), mannerism, language, accent or behavioural pattern. For such an informal intelligence system it is always better to recruit people through the police, local administration and the DC’s office. Let this be a joint asset, it will be far more helpful than trying to go solo by a purely military initiative in a purely public domain. Finally gathering situation reports on a daily basis from the units/battalions who are in direct contact, would be helpful.
H. Press
The press must be encouraged to interact. It controls rumours and limits the effects of hostile propaganda. Always use the press to reach out to the people with sympathy and empathy. Mention events undertaken by militants as a war against the people. Always place the government, the law-enforcement and the administration as those elements that stand between the people and the militants. Through the Press, ask for help: information, identification of hostile leadership, unusual activity etc. Never threaten the people or accuse them of anti-government activities, even if there are some. Be aware of the grievances of the people and talk about them in frequent press conferences and ask people for solutions/suggestions. These complaints are usually about: prices, sale of harvests, electricity and gas bills, taxes, justice etc. Address these through complaint-cells but never adopt a time-passing approach that has no conclusion related to the issue. Ask the civil administration to establish informal markets, set-up government approved purchase depots for harvests, ensure mills pay the farmers; give such activity wide press coverage. Encourage people’s committees to resolve local problems related to availability of goods, prices, cleanliness, traffic management and use the press to empower these committees.
I. Damage assessment
Ensure a proper study is undertaken to list damage done to infrastructure. Formats need to be structured in accordance to the ground situation, covering pastoral and livestock damage, disruption to agriculture and its effects, destruction and damage to residential areas, damage to common infrastructure like roads, electricity and communication, losses to retail business, food services etc., disruption of any corporate functioning or industrial activity. These lists to be read out in open meetings with the community so that they are transparent and no one is either over-compensated or then under-estimated and that plans for repair and restoration are all public and open. Ensure timely release of funds for the rebuilding of the damaged infrastructure. Funds, preferably, not to be released to individuals but to contractors instead, based on the work undertaken. Each phase of the work to be inspected by a team of military engineers who would approve release of funds. Funds to be managed by the civil administration and not by the military headquarters.
J. Regional Development Team (RDT)
A regional development team to be setup comprising the civil administration, a military representative, representative of the local leadership and any donor providing funds and resources. Thus the team has four parts to it but if there is no donor then a representative of the provincial government responsible for securing the development funds. The team should take into account the resources and funds available and determine their own capacity. The local leadership should forward a list of prioritised projects needed in the region. Some of these projects coordinated with NGOs, philanthropists, donors and the government are suggested as follows:
• Basic Health Units.
• Schools.
• Water projects.
• Emancipation of women.
• Flood Protection mini-dams.
• Solar/hydro-electric plants on small scale.
• Poly-technic institutions.
• Tube-wells.
• Irrigation Drains.
• Farm to Market Roads.
• Development of local markets, their marketing and sales of local produce.
• Processing locally produced minerals, their production and finishing.
• Assistance to corporate companies that are willing to set up their operations in the region, i.e. mining, irrigation, surveying for minerals, industry, food processing etc.
14. Combat Application (Battalion and below)
This portion is the main purpose of this document and as to why it was actually written. CT and anti-terrorism operations are battles fought by young men in decentralised small- unit operations, i.e. section and platoon, at times company level but hardly beyond that. The effects of these activities are phenomenal and have strategic connotations. The operations may be conceived and planned at Soldiers from the Mujahid Force higher levels and in keeping with the larger picture of national security but this is rarely comprehended down below where orders are simply related to immediate combat. Of late, we have witnessed and suffered too many causalities, where one would not go so far as to saying they were unnecessary but one could safely state that these were avoidable. Suffering causalities and suffering reverses are part of a combat experience but in the case of CI/CT/, it is very rare that such causalities are due to the enemy’s superior weapons, training, application or numerical superiority.
Taking on a State apparatus is no small thing and one should be confident in one’s own capacity as well as capability against a ragtag militant organisation. Successive losses lead to falling morale and loss of confidence in oneself, in one’s leadership as well as in one’s purpose. This should not happen. Most combat reverses in a CT environment are attributable to poor leadership, bad training, violation of SOPs, individual incompetence and inferior intelligence. These are the main issues that need to be addressed prior to embarking on operations.
Training of one’s troops in handling firearms, shooting proficiency by day and night, movement by stealth, fire and move amongst troops, use of smoke and proper use of rocket launchers/grenades is an essential part of surviving through such a conflict. To begin with, it must be clear that such conflicts have no generalised recipes and there no responses that can be recommended that fits all situations. So the first and foremost matter that must come to mind should be in how to respond to every situation as one is faced with – responses must be situational and one should not look for any readymade solution or an already tried out method; every situation deserves its own exclusive response.
Whereas as studying past experiences and understanding the obtaining environment in which success and failures were arrived at is very important, yet in this conflict, one is on his own and must rely on his own assessment, analysis and plan. It is here that an individual plan is constructed – under fire. The plan may be a product of activating a contingency plan, of the many, one may have come up with – a highly recommended practice; or then it could be a totally new plan, constructed from scratch, at that moment, related to the immediate ground situation. Some of the most important steps to be undertaken at battalion and below are suggested as follows:
A. Pre-Induction
Acquire a proper training facility for the training of the troops. Focus on the following:
• Hardening of vehicles: Ensure the sides are protected but allow for aimed fire by the side sitting opposite to each sideplate. Tailgate to be modified for easy exit of troops.
• Mounting automatics on vehicles: Should be able to rotate 360 degrees. Dead ground around the vehicle must be factored into any consideration. Ensure safety of own driver/commander and specially the bonnet/forward-hood of the vehicle.
• All vehicles should have tops removed and front windscreen lowered where possible, except load-carrying vehicles. This permits for easy exit and to put down effective aimed fire.
• Arrange for run-flat tyres if available. If not demand these at least for some vehicles needed for critical roles.
• Arrange for semi-auto shot-guns to be used from moving vehicles with SG/ LG cartridges. Aimed fire is not necessary with these and they have a radius of effect and far more effective than rifle fire. Should have one to two per vehicle. These are easily available, cheap to acquire and are locally constructed.
• Collect maps of the area that the unit is to be inducted into. Study them and try to replicate the designated area in the training space.
• Focus on small arm shooting under duress. Move from individual fire to section/platoon level coordinated fire.
• Arrange for and demand Night Vison Devices (NVDs) in both planes, thermal imaging (TI) as well as image intensifier (II). Troops must understand that the former is active and can be picked up by the opposing side while the latter is passive and cannot be picked up. Teach troops the difference between night observation and night-sighted aimed fire and how to coordinate the use of both. The former has a field of view of anything up to 45 degrees and the latter usually between 5 to 7 degrees. Special priority to be paid towards night operation, overwatch, i.e. movement under area covered by night observation. Patrols must learn to scan areas and spaces with night vision. Camps must be equipped with search lights to ‘blind’ enemy II night-vison positions around camp. Positions around the camp that facilitate direct fire through TIs to be earmarked and kept under observation and if enemy activity is picked up in these positions, to be engaged by snipers in own pre-designated firing pits. Night firing practices, zeroing and calibrating of both sights, i.e. TI and II to be done extensively.
• Learn how to use lasers to illuminate and engage targets.
• Ensure MG deployments are understood and they have their fixed-line mountings for defended localities.
• Impart training in how to establish arcs of responsibility, range cards around defended localities, mutual support of automatics, grazing-fire from dug-outs towards predesignated killing ground.
• Define methods in how to establish and extend parameter of security.
• Develop the technique of moving under cover of fire.
• Establish the need for different layers of tactical over watch and how to coordinate them.
• Learn how to construct a ‘sanghar’ (stone walled embankment). Develop defended localities with at least 300 meters of field-of-fire and create observation towers facilitating a field-of-view extended to at least 1000 meters where ever possible. Feed stray dogs and affiliate them with the camp and the vicinity, to create a natural early warning system.
• Sensitise troops to always carry and correctly handle a weapon at all times, including rest and sleep. Alarm rallies must be rehearsed. Every man must know his position/ role and responsibility viz. viz. the others in the section/platoon when the alarm is called.
• Ensure that the troops carry pouch ammunition, spare magazines, water bottle and shell dressing. Everyman must be equipped with goggles/sunglasses to prevent splinter injuries to the eyes.
• Conduct exercises in keeping with the anticipated operations. These must include anti ambush drills, fire and move to advance in contact, defending a locality against a spontaneous attack, advance in contact.
• Understand the dynamics of coming under fire. Subject the troops to fires of different weapons at night from nearby pits. Become accustomed to the echoes of all round fire and learn to pass instruction to troops during such fires. Try and identify the direction of the fire, gets troops to respond in the given direction by firing back. Use illumination if available – should carry such illumination on person as an SOP.
• Focus on mounting and dismounting from vehicles. Taking position, firing back, extricating under smoke cover, how to take up cover and develop a nearby rally area based on clock-defined-directions to a determined location by the commander (1 o’clock etc.). How to provide all-round fire or otherwise, with mutual support, as needed. The response must be concentrated and coordinated to provide a homogeneous effect.
• Sniper action is very important. Remember, snipers on middle-heights (500 feet) are isolated and untenable since they are vulnerable to the height behind them. Thus, there must also be snipers on the sky-lines, that may not be able to fire effectively on the ground, but are still necessary for the protection of the sniper at mid-height. Thus sniper teams make four individuals with one set armed with 7.62 Styr/Remington at mid height and another with .50 Range-masters on the skyline. Both have their observers with them and who chart the wind, direction and speed for the sniper as well as acquire the target and man the hand-held communication system. Minimum of three to four sniper teams (12 to 16 individuals) must occupy positions in mutual support of one another. The snipers must be always be supported by artillery and a Quick Reaction Force (QRF) and if need be attack helicopters. Sniper teams can become force multipliers when drones are integrated with the sniper action teams.
• Never cross defiles with the whole body. Use scouts to secure it first, allow a portion to clear the defile before moving the main body through. Heights dominating any movement are always to be treated as a threat. Such heights have to be physically secured to protect columns passing below them. If the height on one side is only held, it denies enemy movement but does not totally secure one’s own moves. If there is a second, parallel height on the opposite side and if both are held on either side, then own movement is covered, secured and certain. All possible heights enroute must be registered for air-burst artillery fires when needed. Extensive use of drones can provide early warning and if armed can engage the enemy.
• Every force must have a reserve such as a QRF or a follow in zone body. Responses must always be flexible and planned for. Untoward incidents can be handled by use of QRFs, artillery fires, attack helicopters, use of smoke and drones.
• Reporting and sensing is a very important part of sentry duties. Guards must be familiar with the procedures and must have duplicate reporting channels. Any untoward incident must be investigated and reported by guards on duty regardless of whose area of responsibility it is in. Method to report must be refined so that duplicate reports are not received from numerous guards at the same time exaggerating the event, numbers or incident.
• Study the map/terrain and identify potential ambush spots or sniper areas. Draw contingency plans for these to cover all likely ambush sites, positions facilitating sniper and the possibility of IEDs. The only guaranteed approach to IEDs is physically eye-balling the road – in an asymmetric contest, the IED has figured out to be the most effective tool in the hand of the terrorist and there is no technical answer to this threat as yet. Clearing areas of IEDs is a tedious and time consuming activity but cannot be avoided. Never hurry through the procedure and learn to be patient. ‘Patience’ is a principle of war in a ‘Low Intensity Conflict’. For road opening days or securing roads for convoys, mobile patrols of a section strength, to be established with a (suggested) 5 kms gap between them for specified periods. On account of constant individual/collective stress and tensions suffered while undertaking such duties, the duration, should be usually limited to a week or 10 days etc. These patrols take up position parallel to the road to be travelled on by a body of troops/convoy with a clear field of observation and fire. They must be self-sufficient with emergency-food and water but should be administratively supplied with necessary stores through a vehicle at midday or any designated suitable time. If a road length of 50 Kms has to be protected it would require a company, i.e. 9 sections and as such the company as a whole should be tasked to undertake the road protection along with its command structure and supporting weapons such as the 60 mm mortars. The thumb rule should be a company for 50 Kms but can be reduced or increased as per the ground situation in keeping with the terrain, visibility, threat and time. Patrols must be equipped with smoke, communication and at least one Machine gun per group. Each patrol walks the 5 Kms ahead of its location, beginning at first light and then takes up position observing/protecting the road by fire after occupying the next position, i.e. 5 kms away, vacated by the patrol before it. While walking the 5 kms to the next position the patrol must eyeball the road physically and use detectors where suspicious to detect any IEDs planted. The road movement begins only after clearance has been given by all patrols and they have confirmed that no IEDs exist. The farther most patrol is given a vehicle to loop back and become the first patrol in this series of deployments and this cycle is repeated. These patrols must check back through communication every hour, on the hour. This process of sanitising the road every morning should take about two to three hours. The patrols must be supported by artillery and attack helicopters, must be on call. The timings etc. are all suggested and the recommended format must be modified to suit the situation and needs where ever necessary. If the roads are not to be kept open permanently or for only a small duration, then the establishing of the road protection patrols must be scheduled and sited accordingly. However, it is important to understand, in any organised movement, under these circumstances, that is not covered by or under a formal over watch, protected or supported, remains a moved dependent on fluke/chance. Avoid taking a chance. Familiarise the troops with these plans and make them go through their paces.
B. Induction into Operational Area
This is a sensitive matter and depends on whether the induction is a consequence of a routine rotation plan or a fresh induction into an area that has no military presence. In the former situation, it is suggested that the movement be managed, controlled and protected by the out-going battalion. On no account should the civil administration or the police lead the military convoy or provide navigation for it; such a posture shows a weak command dependent on the very people one has been sent to protect. The fresh battalion to stage its induction through the FAA. Here it should take charge of any specialised equipment issued to the battalion before it, undertake a day for reconnaissance and get briefed. The induction should be graduated and a platoon/company to relieve the outgoing platoon/ company. However, when being inducted into a new area, the situation changes dramatically. The following is a suggested course of action:
• Get the total intelligence picture available but always establish own sources of information as well. It’s not the intelligence unit’s responsibility to induct a unit and is the unit’s own responsibility. Coordinate with the civil administration and the existing law enforcement troops.
• Send a heavy advance party (Usually a company level strength) with duplicated communication system and attack helicopter support on demand. Ensure artillery in range is available to support the movement of the advance party. A QRF must be at hand to aid and assist the advance party if need be.
• The Advance party secures tactical ground, sets up observation and protection of routes. Deploys snipers and communication nodes. It is a good idea to carry RC292 antennas to boost VHF communication.
• The Main body then moves forward no later than 48 hours but preferably within 24 hours, leap frogging the remaining assets past the advance party and to the flanks thus securing spaces. After a passage of 72 hours, the battalion should be in a positon to state that it has secured the route to the area and the area itself and that both are now under effective observation as well as fire.
• Ensure there is a secure and protected water source in the area. If not look into the possibility of digging a shallow well. If this too is not possible then identify the nearest water point and coordinate with other units for a collective daily schedule for water collection thus facilitating sharing of resources such as protection and security. Market purchases must be well coordinated, not too frequent and properly protected. The establishment of an FAA by the formation would facilitate logistics and all rear oriented movement.
C. Conduct
Once one is deployed and into the operations themselves, one must take the time to familiarise oneself with the terrain and the surrounding areas. Take stock of all weapons, their maintenance and stowage. Establish perimeter EW systems immediately, develop an alarm system and allocate fire arc responsibilities. Setup a system of standing patrols/ scouts if possible to create a stand-off between own position and the enemy. First and foremost, identify the immediate threat and having recognised it, take up all necessary precautions against it. The threat in insurgencies/militancy is as follows:
• Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device (VBIED), which could be suicidal or casually parked. The camp area must be sited so or protected as such that no vehicle can directly approach its perimeters. This can be done through erecting obstacles of sandbags, concrete barriers or other such improvisations. Casual vehicles parked along frequented routes to be approached with caution and not permitted within own vicinity or on these routes used frequently by own troops.
• IEDs. Already covered in the pre-induction training paras.
• Rocket attacks are the most common method of militant activity. These are usually RPGs and have a maximum range of 300 meters. The Russian models have a self-destruct capability at maximum range which can turn into an air burst. Gathering of troops must be avoided at all costs. Mud overhead shelters to be made in designated areas. Areas from where such fire can be undertaken must be kept under observation as well as frequently patrolled.
• Small arm fire, this is usually from about 100 meters except for sniper action which could be from ranges up to 6 to 700 meters. Well located sandbag protection should be placed for such an occurrence. The immediate periphery should be covered by protected siting of MGs on fixedline in mutual support – enfiladed to the space they cover.
• Physical attack, in rear cases, may take place and is undertaken by the enemy only when he is confident in his numerical strength. Use of DFs help in such a case. Positons in depth must be used. In fact, a well defended locality, properly sited is near-impossible to be over-run.
D. The camp must have designated defensive fire areas (DFs) for the artillery, and an established all-round protection system of the camp. An Early Warning (EW) system must be set-up through sensors, observation and outposts. Create QRFs within the camp. Rehearse responses to attacks by rockets and small arms. Avoid bunching up and designate areas within sections. However, one must keep in mind that one has not been inducted into the area to defend space but to eliminate terrorism. As such develop perimeters, i.e. camp perimeter (immediate camp boundary and 300 meters’ field of fire), then a tactical perimeter where the battalion/company can fire for effect (usually up to about 2 Kms for a battalion), after which, an intelligence perimeter (about 6 Kms to 10 Kms), the space where you have access to information through the locals or the intelligence set-up. If this area is not clearly defined, then establish it through own initiative. The last is the perimeter of influence, this is where, the battalion/company exercises a degree of familiarity with the local population, its leadership and the grounded families. (To include the nearby villages etc. about 10Km to 15 Kms and kept active and alive through regular patrols).
These areas are coordinated with flanking units/ battalions and must not be duplicated. It must be kept in mind that this last perimeter, i.e. the perimeter of influence will determine whether one is winning the conflict or not. The four basic signatures that determine the effect of one’s deployment are: first, does one, own the road and communication lines, two, is the force popular amongst the local people and inspires confidence amongst them, three, is the DC’s offices/courts functional and the writ of the government visible, fourth and last, does one have control of the area’s exits and entry. If one can check-mark these four issues, one is definitely winning, is in control and is influencing the situation in favour of the government.
The main lynch pin determining success as far as battalion level operations are concerned, lies in patrolling. These must be sent out on different routes every night. The nights must be illuminated with patrol activity with varied schedules but only by night. Routes must change and areas be picked in irregular patterns. The battalion must own the night and dominate darkness by presence, observation and fire. Patrols can be supplemented by spontaneous ambushes established astride suspected routes and frequent temporary mobile check posts to spontaneously check movement. All activities to be undertaken at night and discreetly. Criminals, even if not terrorists must be accounted for by detaining and arresting smugglers, drug peddlers and thieves etc. the message that gets out is clear – the writ of the government is in place.
One should keep in mind, that no criminal activity, i.e. chopping of trees, speeding, pollution can be tolerated within the shadow of the uniform when the military is deployed to establish order. One should not avoid such obligations by a silly argument that it was not in one’s mandate to do so – there is no limited mandate after Article 245 is imposed. Remember the conflict must be taken as far away as possible from the battalion/company area to the door-step of the enemy.
E. Every individual must understand that plans are debatable and one should be allowed the space to question or suggest/recommend changes for their improvement. The mission is never debatable and once embarked upon, everything must be done to achieve it and for the operation to succeed. Troops and young officers must learn to accept and handle battle casualties – the concept of the Golden Hour must be clear to all and evacuation plans must be concurrent to the combat taking place. It is always good to remember that a good unit never leaves its dead or wounded behind under any circumstances and its always one for all and all for one.
F. On the occasion when a battalion is tasked to clear an area or a locality, it must undertake the operation with very deliberate preparedness. Ensure that the unit is familiar with crop pattern astride avenues of advance and whether such crops provide cover to the enemy. Choice of crops should be regulated if possible, keeping this in mind. One ought to also keep in mind that the militant is never affiliated with spaces and can easily withdraw from it when threatened. However, the same does not stand true for the military, i.e. losing ground is a huge demoraliser and diminishes the confidence of the people within the military. Thus, the fist advice is to never undertake an operation that is not sustainable after having concluded it – everything ‘won’ is for keeps for all times.
There are two types of clearances that may be required by unit/sub-unit action. The type of operations that are likely to be conducted are either in built up areas or in open spaces or then one progressing to the other.
• Built Up Areas: Keep in mind that the difference between a conventional conflict and LIC is that essentially in the former you know where the enemy is and how he is deployed but it is difficult dealing with him. In LIC it is difficult to identify who the enemy is or where he is but when you do find him, it is relatively easier to take him on. Thus in built up areas or crowded spaces, people automatically or are deliberate made to become human shields and the possibility of collateral damage rises to a disproportionate equation. This imposes immediate restrictions on the use of air support and artillery cover. The first thing one must do in these circumstances, is to either impose curfew and operate at night if one is well equipped with NVDs; or then evacuate the civilian population through announcements. In the latter case, civilians must be evacuated and treated as refugees. They should be escorted to pre-designated areas where food and water along with medical facilities are available. A separate holding area for women and children must be arranged. Children must have access to sweets and toys while its always a good idea to provide shawls (chaddars) to the women – it’s a symbolic gesture that endears one to the people. Also a separate penned area to be designated for livestock. The responsibility for managing the livestock should be given to some of the people from amongst the evacuated lot. Fodder and water for the animals must be arranged. Basic shelters are established, protection from the weather – hot or cold to be ensured. Refugees must be treated with civility and dignity. If needed, the refugees to be transported to the FAA for further relief elsewhere. Once the village/ built-up area has been evacuated or curfew has been imposed, then search and cordon operation must begin. All operations must be undertaken on foot. A cordon of the overall area to prevent anyone escaping must be established to prevent escape of those within or reinforcement from elements from without the area. The electricity, gas and water into the area must be cut-off. Try and coordinate the stoppage of cell-phone signals. Own reliance on communication must be on integral wireless and walkie-talkies. Frequency Hopper sets (R1000 etc. or any latest/new equivalent) to be arranged to intercept enemy conversation on air and to gather intelligence through such interpretation. The overall target area should be divided into sectors and operations should preferably advance in a phased manner from sector to sector – it is not recommended to operate in parallel sectors simultaneously unless the ground situation suggests that it is more beneficial. The roof tops must be occupied and observation posts must be established. Troops must try and secure high ground/ roof tops overlooking the immediate sector and set themselves up as a fire base in support of the immediate operations. The sector being engaged should be preferably isolated by keeping other sectors under observation, speculative small arm fire and smoke. Drone application can be a force-multiplier in such operations by providing crucial intelligence about enemy location, strength and weapon systems. Tanks may be used but only after a suitable area has been cleared for them. Their purpose is to provide close support, provide a mechanised reserve element and demoralise the militants. Attack helicopter may be used overhead for seek and destroy tasks but control must remain with the field commander. This is essentially to avoid a blue-on-blue incident since own troops would be on roof tops and very close to the enemy. Each sector to be cordoned separately and then searched. For night operation illumination must be at hand. A vehicle borne generator with flood lights on a modified boom is essential as this also provides a point for troops to orient with. The command Headquarter should be established near this illumination. As each area is cleared, a command structure is established central to the village and the village is reported cleared. Breaking into places must be done by employing smoke, stun grenades, HE Grenades and tear gas first. Clearance operations progress through drills executed by small teams in pairs and within each pair, fire and move must be resorted to, covering the move of one another. Every man must be covered by fire and every group must be supported by another and should move from one bound to another. QRFs of at least a platoon strength must follow the progress of the operation. The QRF to be divided into two groups and should advance by leapfrogging. A suitable reserve must be maintained at the outer cordon and should preferably be vehicle borne. After the operation has been completed, damage assessment must be recorded, photographed and listed with estimated cost. It is always a good idea to carry out major repair work through a local contractor arranged by the civil administration, before bringing in the refugees back to their houses. The civil administration and military must establish a joint team to list compensation demands made by the people on their return. The complaints to be verified on ground and recorded.
• Space Clearances: Many a times operations are undertaken to clear a specific space. Such spaces are identified for their tactical importance due to domination of a route, or that they are a communication centre and provide a hub for movement in the area. These areas are also those held by militants for their own hides/ protection and become administrative/ operating bases. They are usually located on heights and astride major communication lines and comprise of caves and tunnels into the mountain/hill sides. In such operations the worry of collateral damage is minimal. The first step in such an operation is intelligence gathering. Learn as much as possible about the enemy objectives and intent, strength and weapon deployment. Understand that militants avoid standing-battles and evacuate early when it is felt that their position is no longer tenable or it being over-run is inevitable. They will always have escape routes defined for themselves with alternative safe ground to where they can withdraw/ shift. It is essential to be current on the terrain situation and to analyse where the enemy could withdraw to and which routes would be used. After getting the required information and briefing the troops a plan is drawn up to assault the feature and to secure it. A template is being suggested here for application against a strong position, however, the field commander is free to modify it or make an exclusive plan based upon his own tactical understanding and better operability. It is suggested that the area be isolated by strategically positioning ambush parties along the routes leading or going away from the feature. The periphery of the objective, i.e. 5 to 7kms on its flanks be patrolled by armed helicopter. This is mainly to keep the area under observation, prevent escape from the enemy’s defended position and to deny entry to any reinforcements. Aerial bombing is resorted to soften the area by the air force. Using 2000 LBs is recommended since anything smaller is not effective against tunnelling/caves. Once the air force clears the area, artillery engages registered targets and tanks advance under artillery cover. The Tanks where possible over-run the position and if the terrain does not allow it, the tanks provide close support to assaulting infantry. The battalion mortars to be deployed suitable in support of the operations and a central firebase must be established. The feature is divided into platoon objectives. Infantry moves by fire and move, one section providing a firebase for the moving section. All the platoons move simultaneously towards their own respective objectives.
Once the position has been taken by own troops, the immediate area adjacent to every platoon is searched for booby traps and IEDs. This concept of employing assets/troops in a defined template was called the A4-1 Strategy (Air force, artillery, attack-helicopters, armour and infantry – in this priority). The area-search must over-lap with the neighbouring platoon. Tanks withdraw to a central location and now constitute a mobile reserve for the battalion/company. They would do this also if they had overrun the feature/objective and after immediately handing it over the positon to the infantry. Follow up troops to take charge of any captured/surrendered individuals and remove them to a holding area under armed escort. They are to be kept under guard and restrained till they are sent to the rear. Their disposal should be through the civil administration after being interrogated by the intelligence.
In the event of any HVTs or Shura Members in custody, they are to be handed over to the ISI as soon as possible. The objective area is considered cleared only after getting all-clear reports from the outer cordon ambush positons, each platoon on the objective, the tanks after being reconstituted as reserves and the artillery.
G. Having secured the built up area/ feature/space etc., the troops must be kept in holding-ground posture for as short a period as possible. The civil administration with police/levies and VD should take over the area from the military with the help of the local leadership. In some cases, a local Lashkar can be raised with a specific objective of maintaining order, comprising of only local youths (normally every 40th person – called the chilwasti) while the rest support those selected for the Lashkar. It is for that specific duration, bound to their defined own area only, self-sustained, bearing their own personal arms, constructed under the orders of the local leadership only and its individuals remain on a rotational basis amongst the local population. The military, where possible must avoid, diluting itself by holding ground or these positions. The military must return the area back to the people through the civil administration, and the quicker, the better.
The military must withdraw and concentrate in depth at a suitable locality till de-inducted and must concentrate on preserving its combat potential. Once the operations are over, the trinity of force, i.e. Army, FC, and Levies, under these circumstances, must be employed and allocated space/tasks as per defined operational jurisdiction as follows:
• The roads and communication networks to be handled by the levies. Checkpoint to be established and manned by the levies. With the FATA merger, the levies may be replaced by the police.
• The tactical sites of importance, forts and dominating ground to be held by FC. Most of the forts in the vicinity would be manned by the FC. The FC is the first force to come to the help of the levies when needed.
• Central villages/towns and cities is where the Army gets concentrated and remains in support of the civil authorities. Minimum exposure to the civilian population to be undertaken except in the organisation of welfare projects, establishing complaint cells and sports events.
15. Conclusion
As expressed earlier, the LIC, Counter Insurgency/terrorism operative scenario is a very fluid one. It is a young man’s war and a highly de-centralised one. There can be no one solution that fits all, nor a defined determined remedy, for such a conflict and as such each plan at the lower level is a product of situational awareness and understanding. This document only intends to equip officers with this understanding – one is on his own. Initiative at the company and platoon level is in remaining pro-active, and one step-ahead of the enemy and this in itself is the nature of such conflicts. Each confrontation, every event has a separate story to tell and must be clearly dealt with through an anticipated application and not through a conventional tactical appreciation. The battles are small-unit actions but the results reverberate at strategic level affecting the State in the more ways than one: politically, administratively, at the domestic as well as the at the international plane. It can only be hoped that our young men can stand up to this challenge and preserve this nation from the scourge of militancy and violence.
If you can keep your head when all about you while all others are losing theirs, and blaming you.
If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you but make allowance for their doubting you,
If you can wait and not be tired of waiting or being lied about, don’t deal in lies,
If you can dream – and not make dreams your master,
if you can think – and not make thoughts your aim,
If you can force your heart and nerve and sinew
To serve your turn long after they are gone,
And hold on when there is nothing in you
Except the will which says to them: hold on
Then the world will be yours and everything in it,
What’s more you’ll be a man, my son.
(An extract from IF, Rudyard Kipling)
