A Strategy of “Deliberate Ambiguity”
Abstract
Israel’s nuclear capability is one of the most potentially critical and discussed variable on the world scene today. Israel does not have an overt nuclear doctrine beyond its insistence that it will not introduce nuclear weapons into the region. Instead, it follows the policy of what Avner Cohen calls “nuclear opacity” – visibly possessing nuclear weapons while denying their existence. In this way Israel has policy of deliberate ambiguity. The primary objective of its strategy of deliberate ambiguity is to establish its nuclear deterrence and hegemony on its adversaries in the region. So, the Israeli officials perceive that their ambiguous nuclear status can only deter the Arab adversaries and also reduce the influence of superpowers in the region.
The state of Israel is the sixth nuclear power in the world and the first in the Middle East but its nuclear behaviour is absolutely dissimilar from the rest of the nuclear powers because Israel has not confirmed its nuclear status officially. Several evidences prove that it has a nuclear weapons program and has a strategy for using them. No one knows about Israel’s strategic nuclear doctrine because from the beginning the country’s nuclear policies are based on “Deliberate Ambiguity”. All the elements of its nuclear policy remain in the basement. In the military structure of countries the doctrine explains how national force will fight in various combat operations. Secrecy is a very critical aspect of the Israeli nuclear doctrine. Total ambiguity over Israel’s strategic targeting doctrine could cause an adversary state to underestimate Israeli retaliatory resolve. On the other hand, a continuing policy of total ambiguity could cause an enemy state to overestimate its vulnerability to a first-strike attack by Israel’s nuclear forces.
Israel’s official behaviour toward nuclear weapons
Based on Israeli official statements, Israel has formed a policy of deliberate nuclear ambiguity. No Israeli leader has admitted that their country possesses nuclear weapons but they have indirectly admitted that their country has nuclear power. They are not disclosing anything about their nuclear warheads. There is nothing certain about the Israeli nuclear force but there are some evidences of the Israeli nuclear status.
Levi Eshkol, the third Prime Minister (1963 to 1969) of Israel declared that “Israel has knowledge to make an atomic bomb”1 in the wake of the Six Day War of June 1967. The Israeli biophysicist and President (1973 to 1978) Ephraim Katzir at the time of Yom Kippur or October War in 1974 stated that “Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East but it had the potential to construct such weapons within a reasonable period of time”. In an interview on British Television he repeated that Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East.2
The former Defense/ Foreign Minister and fighting symbol of the state, Moshe Dayan, the fourth chief of staff of the IDF (1953 to 1958) rebuffed the Katzir’s statements and stated on June 1980, “We never said we won’t use atomic weapons – we only said we would not be the first to use them” but on 25 June 1981 in an interview with The New York Times, he stated unambiguously that “we don’t have any atomic bomb now” but added:
“We do not have the capacity to produce nuclear weapons, and if the Arabs are willing to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East, then Israel should not be too late in having nuclear weapons too.”3
In this way Israeli leaders created the ambiguity by denying or admitting that their state had nuclear weapons. In a conversation with Shmuel Katz the Prime Minister’s advisor in 1977 expressed his opinion on 2 November 1983 that:
“If the Arabs in the region are furtively near to completing the atomic device and it became known to Israel, then this Jewish state could counter the Arab threat by producing bombs of its own within a few days or less.”4
At that time this statement showed that the state had nuclear program for rapid manufacturing of nuclear weapons. A report of the Telegraph point out that Israel had nuclear program and weapons to deter other states in the Middle East. Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, in a three day visit to Germany and Italy5 in 2006 expressed his views to the European nation and quoted to a German channel that Israel was among the states that possessed an atomic bomb.6 He provided justification by saying that Iran was the reason of Israel’s nuclear program because Iran was threatening to wipe Israel off the map.7 Later, it was also verified by a spokesman that the Prime Minister did not mean to say that Israel wished to achieve nuclear weapons.8
When the state of Israel was created, a series of wars was fought between Israel and Arab states. On 6 October 1973 when the Egyptian and Syrian armies launched a surprise attack against Israel, its Prime Minister Golda Meir, due to fear of defeat ordered Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) to activate nuclear warheads.9
Israeli foreign minister Abba Eban (1966 to 1974) pointed out in 1966 that “Israel has not initiated and will not initiate to commence use of neither new arms nor any type of new weapons, conventional or non-conventional into the region”.10 But in 1970 she repeated that Israel would not be the first in the region in case a nuclear race started in the region.11
In 1981 former Defence Minister Moshe Dayan refined Abba Eban’s words and stated that the official Israeli policy was that Israelis were not going to be the first ones to introduce nuclear weapons into the Middle East and warned that his state had the capacity to construct nuclear weapon in a short time if any Arab state did so.12 Among the earliest and most prominent proponents of a nuclear weapons program were Israel’s first Prime Minister, David Ben Gurion, and his close aides Shimon Peres and Moshe Dayan.
All Israeli officials presented vague statements about the nuclear status of their country like Dayan’s statement in which he did not mention whether Israel only had the necessary technological capacity or the component was ready to be assembled into a warhead. The statements were also uncertain about the nuclear status of Israel but created ambiguity at the international level.
The CIA has also confirmed that the state of Israel had a nuclear program and weapons. It stated about the nuclear position of Israel saying that:
“We believe that Israel already has produced nuclear weapons. Our judgment is based on Israeli acquisition of large quantities of uranium, partly by clandestine means; the ambiguous nature of Israeli efforts in the field of uranium enrichment; and Israel’s large investment in a costly missile system designed to accommodate nuclear warheads.”13
In 1968 CIA issued a report presented by head of the CIA’s science and technology branch, Carl Duckett and confirmed that the state of Israel had nuclear program and had started the production of nuclear weapons.14 In 1974 Duckett said in the report that Israel had ten to twenty nuclear weapons.
By this deliberate ambiguity, the state of Israel is able to avoid direct censure of the world community while at the same time instilling trepidation into the minds of its adversaries in the region. However, Mordechai Vanunu, a former Israeli nuclear technician accepted that Israel had nuclear arsenals. On the basis of this scientist’s escape from Dimona former President Jimmy Carter on 25 May, 2008 in a press conference in annual Hay-on-Waye literary festival in Wales during discussing the Israeli foreign and domestic policies, stated that the state of Israel had 150 nuclear arsenals.15 On the other hand the Israeli government did not confirm the possession of nuclear arsenals. In response to Carter’s statement Mr. Aharon Zeevi Farkash, the head of the Israeli Military Intelligence Directorate, told the news agency The Reuters that “Mr. Carter’s saying is irresponsible.”16
In April 1990 when Saddam Hussein threatened that if Iraq were attacked he would make use of binary chemical weapons that would “consume half of Israel,” Israeli Defence Minister Itzhak Robin responded that “we have the means for a devastating response, many times greater than [the magnitude of] Saddam Hussein’s threats.”17
On June 6, 1993, the Deputy Defence Minister of Israel Mordechai (Motta) Gur stated that:
“Any Arab leader of the country hostile to Israel must carefully weigh what he stands to win or lose if he decides to drop a nuclear bomb on Israel. Each and every Arab leader knows fully well that we will not sit idly by, that [Israel] has an active defence, and that it will not be worth his while to expose his country to the risk of an Israeli retaliation. As far as Israel is concerned, we are capable of turning the situation around in such a way as to make it too costly for anybody to wage a nuclear war against us in the Middle East. The damage Israel will inflict on the nuclear aggressor will far outweigh the so-called profits they may be able to reap. They will never catch us in a moment of weakness, because Israel is capable of dealing a devastating blow which will make a nuclear war not worth their while.”18
Finally, the statements made by Israeli officials and US officials intentionally and unintentionally made it clear that Israel was a country with nuclear weapons. But because of its policy of deliberate ambiguity it was enjoying the effective nuclear deterrent. Nuclear Strategy of Israel
Israel officially has never denied or confirmed about possession of nuclear weapons. Therefore, the behaviour of Israeli government showed that they had maintained a level of ambiguity regarding their nuclear status. It had maintained “deterrence through uncertainty”19 highlighted by Shimon Peres the Israeli President, Israel’s motive for nuclear opacity: “A certain amount of secrecy must be maintained in some fields. The suspicion and fog surrounding this question (nuclear weapons) are constructive, because they strengthen our deterrent.”20
According to Avner Cohen, an expert on Israel’s nuclear policies, opacity is a situation in which a state’s nuclear weapons had not been acknowledged by its leaders, but in which the evidence for the existence of weapons was strong enough to influence the perceptions and actions of other nations.21 The notion of nuclear opacity has two elements. First is the secrecy of nuclear weapons and second is signaling to enemies by statements. Thus Israel is a nuclear power and possesses nuclear weapons. When its officials were asked about nuclear weapons they never confirmed the nuclear position of their state in the region but created ambiguity through controversial statements.
Related to Israel’s capabilities and intentions of its nuclear strategy of “deliberate ambiguity” has been implemented by its first Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion. Therefore, the government has not formally admitted the existence of nuclear weapons nor is there any strong evidence about its nuclear test while it has developed its nuclear infrastructure. It also continually refused to completely open its nuclear facilities for inspection and is not willing to join the NPT.
A. Policy of Deliberate Ambiguity
Israeli officials showed their ambiguous behaviours through statements whenever asked about their country’s nuclear weapons. Diplomatically the Israeli government uses an indirect approach about its nuclear status like it has informed the world about its nuclear weapons but officially they deny the existence of nuclear weapons.
If Israel were to admit publicly that it had nuclear weapons then it might get isolated of its western allies who are much conscious about nuclear proliferation, especially the US. Therefore, Israel is not in a position to risk severing its military and economic support from west but at the same time its primary objective is to establish its deterrence in the region for its adversaries.22
On the basis of these objectives Israel has established its strategy of deliberate ambiguity. The strategy of deliberate ambiguity does not result from the execution of a well-planned design and serves different functions in different situations. It has developed due to several factors in response to international, regional and some domestic considerations. It serves to conceal Israel’s efforts to develop a nuclear infrastructure. Then it helped to prevent conflict with US policymakers when Israel’s nuclear program became central point of American non-proliferation policy. Furthermore, it serves to deny the Arab states a clear picture of nuclear capabilities of Israel and provides a coherent strategic framework to Israeli leaders for governing their country’s nuclear capabilities and intentions.23
There are several evidences to prove that Israel is a nuclear weapons state. In December 1960 the public statement by David Ben-Gurion informed the Knesset that the nuclear reactor in Dimona was developed for peaceful and research purposes.24 In 1986 Mordechai Vanunu, an escaped nuclear technician of Dimona reactor, cleared the whole scene in an interview with Sunday Times and presented photographs of Dimona. The Vanunu story diverted world attention toward Israel because Vanunu was a person who had direct links to Israeli nuclear facilities. He disclosed the secrecy of the Israeli nuclear program. Shimon Peres while discussing about Vanunu stated that:
“All matters dealing with the nuclear subjects, from its beginning up to this day, are classified by the ministerial level as ‘most secret’. Until today we have avoided publication of everything related to nuclear activities in Israel and we have taken strict steps that these matters should not leak out. The nuclear subject has been accorded a ‘preferred secret’ status and we have related to it in this way concerning security clearance procedures. As a defence minister I gave an instruction that the nuclear subject should be guarded in the most secretive way.”25
Israeli policymakers consider the policy of nuclear opacity a great strategic success by avoiding violation of international non-proliferation regimes by denying possession of nuclear weapons. Israel does not admit to having nuclear weapons but is also able to deter its adversaries from posing an existential threat. In short, the strategy of deliberate ambiguity has given Israel military and strategic benefits without having to pay a political cost.26
The policy of non-confirmation is based on the two beliefs of Israeli official. First is the confirmation of any nuclear weapon or capability that would generate a public pressure or encourage Arab states in the region to develop nuclear parity with Israel. The second belief is that the US government forbids providing any financial and technical assistance to countries that have intention to develop its nuclear program unless it is placed under international supervision according to Congressional Symington Law of 1976.27 Therefore, according to Israeli officials the deliberate ambiguity is not a confused nuclear policy because the possession of bomb in the region is Israel’s defensive strategy. The value of ambiguity communicates to adversaries that the state possesses the hidden nuclear weapons.
B. Deterrence with Nuclear Monopoly
It is the aim of nuclear deterrence to eliminate unwanted action of opponents by convincing them that the resultant costs (massive destruction by nuclear attack) would exceed any gains.28 After deliberate ambiguity, Nuclear Deterrence is also one of the essential elements of Israel’s nuclear strategy. The basic objective of the nuclear strategy of Israel is to deter an all out Arab attack for the annihilation of the Jewish state. The Israeli action in the 1973 war showed that the bomb could be used in retaliation and deterrence is one of the essential parts of Israel’s nuclear policy. In the Yom Kippur war of 1973 IDF warned Egypt and deployed land-to-land missiles batteries for Jericho missiles in response to Egypt’s deployment of two division Scud missiles.29 David Elazar, Israel’s Army Chief ordered that the deployment of batteries should not be invisible so that Soviet satellite could detect it and inform Egypt.30
The war brings into question whether the Israeli bomb is a reliable deterrent against massive Arab conventional aggression because the Arabs believed that Israel is in a position to build or possessed a nuclear weapon. It was common view in the war that if Israel would not use its nuclear power against Egypt and Syria because of strong Soviet support. Therefore, the Soviet threat would neutralize nuclear deterrence of Israel. The fact is that the October war of 1973 raised doubts about the value of Israel’s nuclear deterrent. The Arabs attacked Israel with the belief that Israel had not developed a nuclear bomb and they were compelled to strike Israel quickly before it could develop atomic arms. On the other hand, Israel was prepared to retaliate with nuclear weapons and Israeli leaders were ready to launch an atomic counterattack because they feared defeat.31
In 1976, The Time disclosed the entire story of the 1973 war when Prime Minister Golda Meir permitted Defence Minister Moshe Dayan to activate nuclear weapons.32 The story describes the Israeli decision to use nuclear weapons:
“At the start of the 1973 October War the Egyptians had repulsed the first Israeli counterattacks along Suez Canal, causing heavy causalities, and Israeli forces on the Golan Heights were retreating in the face of a massive Syrian tank assault. Major General Yitzhak Hoffi told his superior: “I am not sure that we can hold out much longer.” After midnight Defence Minister Moshe Dayan solemnly warned Premier Golda Meir: “This is the end of the third temple.” Mrs. Meir thereupon gave Dayan permission to activate Israel’s Doomsday weapons. As each bomb was assembled, it was rushed off to waiting air force units. Before any triggers were set, however, the battle on both fronts turned in Israel’s favour.”33
Israel relied upon its bomb and the Prime Minister stated that if Israeli cities were ever attacked by Scuds, “a city-for-a-city policy would be promptly adopted.”34 At the end Israel assured a victory with massive airlift of supplies and US equipment, so atomic warfare proved unnecessary.
General Moshe Dayan, under strong influence by Ben-Gurion played a central role in Israel’s nuclear deterrence. He moved Israel from nuclear potential to manufacture the nuclear weapons. He declared the nuclear deterrent strategy. In 1967 after the Six day war he became the Defence Minister of Israel and stated to a French television that “Israel had the possibility of manufacturing the bomb then”.35 Later, in Canada he stated that “Israel possesses the scientific and technical capability to produce an atomic bomb should the Arab states threaten to use such a bomb, but Israel will never be the first to launch nuclear warfare in the Middle East”.36
In Yom Kippur war of 1973 Israel wanted to expand its nuclear program with the development and deployment of tactical nuclear weapons. Therefore, in the 1970s Israel’s nuclear status became less opaque.
In a December 1974 meeting, president Ephraim Katzir discussed with the Americans and Europeans in Jerusalem about the capability and will to build nuclear weapons that “we now have the potential we will defend this country with all possible means at hand”. In reply to international concerns about Israeli nuclear facilities he said “Why should this worry us? Let the rest of the world worry about it.”37
In 1980 Israel emerged as a nuclear power in Middle East. The major objective of its strategy is to establish its nuclear monopoly for future in the region. Yitzhak Shamir, the Foreign Minister of Israel stated in December 1981 that:
“The third element in our defence policy for the 1980s is our decision to prevent access to nuclear weapons for both confrontation states and potential ones. Israel cannot allow the introduction of nuclear weapons. For us it is not an issue of a balance of terror, but a question of conventional survival. Therefore, we shall have to prevent this danger from the outside.”38
This policy of Israel means that the IDF would pre-empt reply to any effort toward nuclear weapons in the region. In this way Israel attacked Osirak, an Iraqi nuclear reactor, to secure its monopoly over the Middle East.
Conclusion
It is yet to be defined why Israel has adopted the strategy of ‘deliberate ambiguity’ and has not officially declared its possession of nuclear weapons. There are many reasons which must be taken into account to understand its nuclear opacity. One of the most important is that it will generate an arms race in the region and most probably Israel’s Arab rivals may go for developing their own nuclear programs as a nuclear Israel will create insecurity and disturb the delicate balance in the region. On the other hand, Israel cannot let its rivals acquire such capability which can destabilise the existing status quo as it had attacked Osirak nuclear plant of Iraq in 1981. Moreover, Israel is not a signatory to NPT as such sanctions cannot be imposed on Israel and also its installations cannot be brought under the safeguards of IAEA. In 1981 at Nuclear Free-Zone Conference Prime Minister Begin stated that Israel would open all of its nuclear operations to inspection only when the Arab made peace with Israel. Finally, Israel has always observed the stance “not to be the first to introduce nuclear weapons to the Middle East.”
End Notes
1. Frank Barnaby, The Invisible Bomb: The Nuclear Arms Race in the Middle East (London, I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd, 1989), pp. 6-7.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Peter Pry, Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal (London: Westview Pres, 1984), p. 2.
5. Ben Quinn and agencies, “Olmert admits that Israel has Nuclear weapons”, Telegraph.co.uk, 13 December 2006., Available on http:// Olmert admits Israel has nuclear weapons Breaking News News Telegraph.htm, Retrieved on 18,06,2008.
6. Ibid.
7. Ibid.
8. Ibid.
9. Frank Barnaby, “The Nuclear Arsenals in the Middle East”, Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 17, No. 1. (Autumn, 1987), p. 98.
10. Vyoma Nupur, “Israel’s Nuclear Posture: A Cost- Benefit Analysis”, Strategic Analysis, Monthly Journal of the IDSA, Vol. XII, No.7. (October, 1998).
11. Ibid.
12. Martha Wenger, “Recipe for an Israeli Nuclear Arsenal”, MERIP Middle East Report, No. 143, Nuclear Shadow over the Middle East. (November- December, 1986), p. 9.
13. Shyam Bhatia, “ Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East”, (New York: Routledge, 1988), p. 34.
14. Nuclear Weapons, “www.FAS.org”, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/israel/nuke/, Retrieved on 02,06, 2008.
15. “Israel has 150 Nuclear Weapons”, BBC News, Available at http:// \BBC NEWS Middle East Israel ‘has 150 nuclear weapons’.htm, Retrieved on 02,06,2008.
16. Ibid.
17. Shai Feldman, Nuclear Weapons and Arms Control in the Middle East, (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1997), p. 102.
18. Ibid., p. 103.
19. Gawdat Bahgat, “Israel and Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East”, Middle East Policy, Vol. XIII, No.2, (Summer, 2006), p. 125.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Peter Pry, Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal, op. cit., p. 32.
23. Edwin S. Cochran, “Israel’s Nuclear History”, op. cit., p. 152.
24. Gawdat Bahgat, “Israel and Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East”, op. cit., p. 126.
25. Yoel Cohen, “Nuclear Ambiguity and the Media: The Israeli Case”, Israel Affairs, Vol. 12, Issue 3, (July, 2006), p. 531.
26. Gawdat Bahgat, “Israel and Nuclear Proliferation in the Middle East”, op. cit., p. 126.
27. Yoel Cohen, “Nuclear Ambiguity and the Media: The Israeli Case”, op. cit., p. 529.
28. Commander Robert Green, “Nuclear Deterrence”, Nuclear Files.org, Available at http://www.nuclearfiles.org/menu/key-issues/nuclear-weapons/issues/policies/nuclear-doctrine.htm, Retrieved on 05,08,2008.
29. Yoel Cohen, “Nuclear Ambiguity and the Media: The Israeli Case”, op. cit., p. 530.
30. Ibid.
31. Peter Pry, Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal, op. cit., p. 31.
32. Yoel Cohen, “Nuclear Ambiguity and the Media: The Israeli Case”, op. cit., p. 530.
33. Peter Pry, Israel’s Nuclear Arsenal, op. cit., pp. 31-32.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Edwin S. Cochran, “Israel’s Nuclear History”, op. cit., pp. 139-140.
37. Ibid., p. 142.
38. Ibid., p. 144.
