Times are such and narratives so many, that everyone has a point of view and an opinion on anything under the sun. Today, the most pressing issue seems to be the Durand Line, (as the Afghans like to call it), or the international border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, (as Pakistan likes to address it). I for one, do not think the name has any significant effect on the factual positon of this dispute. The Afghan position is that since this was an agreement between the British India and Afghanistan, as such the agreement is not recognised as a valid one between Pakistan and Afghanistan today. This is of course not legally supported by international law which defines the convention specifying a successor State inherits the agreements made by the Government in place before it. It’s clearly defined in the United Nations recognised and stated laws related to the Principle of State Succession, (uti possidetis juris). There is also a fake contention that the agreement was for only a hundred years – not true. Nowhere is it mentioned it was for a hundred years anywhere. Then the Afghans like to argue that it was an agreement made under duress after the Treaty of Gandamak. The treaty of Gandamak was made between Yakub Khan and the British, signed on 26 May 1879 by King Mohammad Yaqub Khan of Afghanistan and Sir Louis Cavagnari of the British Government of India at a British army cam and whereas it involved forfeiting territory and areas to the British, it was never the instrument that led to the demarcation of the border as specified in the Durand Protocol demarcating the area. The Afghans further argue that it has divided the Pushtun Tribes and that they have a right to be unified and thus claim for territory up to the River Indus is put before us. The Pushtuns make up 48 % of the Afghan population and amount to 15 million. In Pakistan the Pushtuns are 18 % of the population but amount to 38 million. How does one expect a larger portion of the Pushtun population to leave their country and join a smaller portion in another one by fidgeting with the border? In any case why would anyone want to voluntarily go to Afghanistan from Pakistan, when Afghan refugees have so often demonstrated that they would rather live here in Pakistan, and had to be forced out!! Whereas, I think this matter is part of history and goes back to the late 1800s, yet people narrate it in a manner which suits their line of argument and we can never get to a final position on this matter. Nevertheless, since this issue comes up again and again, I thought I should place the reality before all so that they can make a judgement on their own.
First of all, based on historical records, the matter was initiated by King Abdur Rehman of Afghanistan, who ascended the throne in 1880, and who wrote to Lord Dufferin, the Viceroy in 1885/6. The letter is on record and available in the British archives but the whole process is a volume of correspondence between the British and the Afghans and not any one singular letter. The original letter is denied by the Afghans but it actually exists. The letter was inspired because of the Russian expansionism in the North of Afghanistan a little earlier and Abdur Rehman wanted that the Southern/Eastern borders be demarcated in similar fashion as they had been done between the Russians and the Afghans` under British felicitation. This letter is preserved in the British India Foreign Department Records (held at the India Office Records, British Library, London). It is referenced in: Selections from records of the Government of India, Foreign Department: Afghanistan, No CXXXII (Frontier Affairs), Calcutta, 1899. And also in Abdur Rehman Khan’ own memoir, The Life of Abdur Rehman, Amir of Afghanistan (1900), which paraphrases rather than reproduces the letter. The content of the letter is summarised below and paraphrased as follows:
The Amir wrote to the viceroy, (Lord Dufferin) expressing his desire to have the limits of Afghanistan and British India clearly defined in order to prevent future disputes and misunderstandings between their frontier tribes.
He emphasized that the absence of a demarcated boundary had led to constant disturbances, raids and clashes along the frontier, and he requested that the British Government send representatives to negotiate and define a permanent boundary line.
Abdur Rehman added that a clear and a mutually agreed frontier would strengthen the ‘friendship and peace’ between and the British Government and prevent ‘ill-wishers’ (a veiled reference to Russia) from creating friction.
This is further corroborated in British Records where the paraphrase of the same letter appears in Foreign Office Despatch (India Office Records, File NO.187F/1885), where Dufferin notes: “ His Highness has addressed to me a communication suggesting that the frontier line between Afghanistan and British Indian possessions of Her Majesty’s Government should be more distinctly defined, with a view to preventing possible misunderstandings between the subjects of the two States.”
This correspondence led to the British detailing of General Roberts to undertake the task of the demarcation but the Afghans were wary of him and did not trust his judgement because he had led the expedition in the War of Retribution where the British had avenged themselves for the reverses they had suffered in the First Afghan War. They totally lay Kabul to waste and were ruthless in their vindication. The Afghans, knowing that Roberts was soon to retire, delayed the process on one pretext or the other till Roberts retired. The task was then given to Mortimer Durand, who undertook the task in 1893.
The relevant primary source extract from the Life of Abdur Rehman, Amir of Afghanistan, volume II (1900) written by Amir Abdur Rehman himself and edited by Sultan Mahomed Khan is reproduced below as the Amir’s own account in his own words:
“ In the early days of my reign, when I saw the restless state of the frontier tribes and the trouble caused by their disputes, I considered it wise to have the limits between territories of Afghanistan and those under the British Government properly defined. I therefore wrote to the Viceroy of India, Lord Dufferin, saying that as the friendship between the two governments was firm and sincere, it was desirable that there should be no uncertainty as to the boundaries of each side, because such uncertainty was the cause of many disturbances and misunderstandings.
I suggested that the boundary line between Afghanistan and the territories under British Rule should be clearly marked, so that each Government might know the extent of its own possessions, and that the tribes living on the border might no longer have occasions for quarrels.
His excellency replied in friendly term, expressing his desire also that peace and order should be maintained, and that the friendship between the two Governments should be strengthened. But he thought it was not necessary to fix a boundary line, as the friendship between us was too strong to admit such disputes”
So after this brief summary of how the Durand Line came about, what is clear from the historical perspective is that it was an Afghan initiative and not British one – in fact the British at first did not even want a formal demarcation. There was no duress or pressure on the Afghans and the process was the product of their own assertions. The Treaty of Gandamak and the Second Afghan War was fought between Yakub Khan and the British in 1879; the correspondence between the British and the Afghans was initiated by Abdur Rehman in 1885 and as such the Gandamak War was not the cause of any demarcation process.
Now about validation of the Line over the years:
1. First ratified between Abdur Rehman of Afghanistan and Sir Henry Mortimer Durand (Foreign Secretary of British India). 12 November, 1893.
2. Second ratification by Amir Habibullah (successor of Abdur Rehman) and the British Indian Government in 1905.
3. Third ratification, between Amir Amanullah and the British Indian Government on August 8th, 1919 in Rawalpindi.
4. Fourth ratification was a confirmation of the 1919 agreement in 1921 which explicitly confirmed, ‘The validity of all previous border agreements which include the Durand Line’.
Nowhere is the treaty time bound and at no time was it imposed on the Afghans. In the event, the division of the Pushtuns is the pressing issue, then the Line should be moved further west so as to integrate the Afghan Pushtuns into Pakistan and not the other way around.
It is hoped that this note is read, understood and noted that the International Border between Afghanistan and Pakistan was inherited by Pakistan as per the international law as specified, the ethnicity favours Pakistan’s position, so does history just as geography stands to vindicate Pakistan’s stand. They should now put the matter to rest and all Afghans be given a copy of this note who do not agree with the alignment of the border.
This essay by Lt Gen (Retd) Tariq Khan presents a deeply researched, rational, and historically grounded defense of Pakistan’s position on the Durand Line dispute. Below is a detailed analysis, appreciation, and commentary:
Analytical Summary
The author methodically dismantles the Afghan claim that the Durand Line is illegitimate or timebound. He begins by clarifying misconceptions — notably that the agreement was not limited to 100 years, nor was it signed under duress after the Treaty of Gandamak. He differentiates between the Treaty of Gandamak (1879) and the Durand Agreement (1893), showing that they are separate historical instruments.
The central argument is that the demarcation was initiated by Amir Abdur Rehman, not imposed by Britain. By citing archival evidence from the India Office Records and Abdur Rehman’s own memoirs, the author demonstrates that the Amir himself requested the boundary’s formalization to reduce tribal conflict and Russian interference.
He then lists four successive ratifications (1893, 1905, 1919, 1921), confirming that Afghanistan repeatedly validated the border. The conclusion rests on international law — specifically the principle of state succession (uti possidetis juris) — asserting that Pakistan, as the successor state to British India, inherited all its borders and treaties.
Critical Appreciation Strengths
● Historical Rigor The piece cites verifiable British and Afghan primary sources, giving it strong evidentiary credibility.
● Logical Clarity The7 author builds a chronological case, separating myth from documented fact.
● Balanced Tone Though patriotic, it avoids inflammatory rhetoric, focusing on reasoning rather than nationalism.
● Educational Intent It aims to correct public misconceptions rather than simply argue Pakistan’s case.
Stylistic merit
Tariq Khan writes with the calm authority of a historian-soldier. His use of italics, quotations, and references lends an academic tone, while the closing paragraph reflects pragmatic realism — “put the
matter to rest.”
Philosophical undertone
The essay appeals to rational sovereignty over emotional ethnicity — the idea that statehood and law must prevail over tribal sentiment and mythologized grievances.
Commentary
This article is a model of strategic communication — concise enough for the public, yet robust enough for policymakers or historians.
It reframes the Durand Line not as a colonial relic but as a product of Afghan initiative, thus inverting the usual blame narrative.
By combining history, law, demography, and logic, it portrays Pakistan’s position as grounded in legitimacy rather than expediency. The closing suggestion — that the border, if revisited at all, would logically expand Pakistan’s domain given demographic realities — is both sharp and diplomatically ironic.
Overall Assessment
A well-researched, persuasive, and intellectually disciplined piece.
It should be preserved as a reference essay for civil-military academies and think-tanks, as it elegantly converts complex historical data into a simple, credible national narrative.
In essence
Tariq Khan does not argue from emotion; he argues from evidence — and therein lies the essay’s strength.
