“War is the great auditor of institutions”. Correlli Barnett
Every armed conflict brings new dynamics to bilateral relations between the belligerents and has an impact on domestic politics. Each party’s role also has an impact on regional and international relations. In April-May 2025, India and Pakistan were engaged in another limited conflict that was quickly defused by direct intervention of President Donald Trump’s administration. There are claims and counter claims on both sides, but it will take some time when more details of the conflict become public.
Now, the political and security establishments of both countries will start the process of evaluation to determine what worked and what did not work in the conflict. Military institutions are the first to start the process of learning from armed conflict with focus on after-action reviews and studying tactical successes and failures. Political leadership usually lags, but its focus is on diplomatic successes and failures and impact on domestic political scene. Political considerations in India and the dominant role of the military in Pakistan points to the direction that both countries will likely carry the exercise within the confines of respective national narratives and probably not absorb the right lessons.
The conflict should be broken down into its component parts for a better understanding. First step is to understand the nature of the state of India and Pakistan and crucial factor of domestic politics. Second is putting this in the regional and international environment context followed by the decision-making process of both countries and lastly, the security infrastructure and bureaucracy of instruments of violence used in the conflict.
In the process of learning, both India and Pakistan will likely succumb to two major pitfalls. First, pre-existing image of the other will color the evaluation process of the recent conflict and second, each side will view the actions of the other during the conflict as autonomous, ignoring the crucial fact that most were reactions to the other side’s actions. If these pitfalls are acknowledged and corrections made for these crucial observations, then review can be a more meaningful exercise. Domestic public opinion and careful consideration of the American view were operative on both sides.
The Jingoistic public frenzy had profound influence on decision making processes of both countries. American angle was important in not using American weapon platforms by both countries (F-16 jets in case of Pakistan and MQ-9 drones by India).
Existing assumptions and expectations will shape the ‘perceptual bias’ that will be reinforced by political expediency (hyper religio-nationalist rhetoric on both sides), organizational pressures (military establishment in both countries especially air forces asking for more share in the defense budget pie and the army and the air force food fight for control of drone assets) and individual career considerations (intelligence and military officers operating in safe career enhancing zones rather than asking serious questions about both the strategic thought as well as operational lacuna). This trend towards operating in the comfort zone rather than asking uncomfortable questions will ensure consistency that will simply confirm existing mindsets in both countries.
External analysts who have no dog in the fight may be able to escape this mental trap and evaluate the conflict on its own merits and demerits. It will be helpful to those engaged in the review process to keep in mind the Robert Jervis division between “psychological milieu” that is the world as an actor sees it and “operational milieu” that is the world in which the policy is carried out.
On both sides the focus will be on the performance of weapons platforms and conclusions will determine future weapons acquisition. Existing doctrines and training gaps will get less attention as this is a hazardous territory.
The air forces of both countries were the key players in this round of conflict therefore the role of combat aircraft and Air Defense (AD) systems will be thoroughly studied. Pakistan’s air Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (IS&R) and combat platforms were better integrated, and it paid the dividends. Combat aircraft acquisition and integration is a long-drawn process and problems with domestic production of Indian jet has frustrated successive Indian air force chiefs. India’s main defense supplier Russia is bleeding from a prolonged conflict and delivery of advanced Russian fighter jets in near term will be challenging. An added concern is that due to international sanctions, some advanced chips for Russian weapons platforms are now supplied by China that can pose a system security risk. Project of domestic production of main combat aircraft has been plagued with serious supply chain and technical issues and these problems are not likely to be solved in the short and medium term. These hurdles will leave Indian force lagging in combat aircrafts. In the near term, the only option is to add more Rafale to the inventory. However, it will create political problems due to downing of these aircrafts in the recent conflict (Pakistan claimed downing three Rafales but India did not publicly acknowledge the loss).
Pakistan will work on upgrade of its F-16s fleet due to recent improvement of relations with the Trump administration. The first item on the agenda is getting back the $350 million military aid that was suspended in 2018. U.S.-Pakistan relations are not at a level for any significant military assistance and Pakistan’s precarious economic situation prohibits acquisition of expensive American military hardware.
Pakistan has already integrated Chinese JF-10 and is jointly producing JF-17. Pakistan would like fifth generation JF-20 and complement it with acquisition of more advanced missiles as well as HQ-19 air defense system. However, China while happy with positive coverage of its weapons systems that can boost exports must balance its act. It will continue upgrades of JF-10 and joint production of JF-17 as well as delivery of export versions of missiles but will not likely deliver more advanced systems in the short term. Generally, export platforms are always inferior to the systems used by the home militaries. There is a convergence of Indian and Chinese interests that can have a dampening effect on more robust Chinese support to Pakistan.
China wants to prevent complete alignment of India in the American Indo-Pacific strategy especially deployment of American weapons systems in the neighborhood. In view of the confusion about Trump administration policies where decades old traditional strategic allies like NATO, Canada and Australia are being snubbed and relations are under severe strain is a reason for pause and reflection for Indian strategic community.
In the recent conflict, India was surprised by an American policy that clearly favored Pakistan. India wants to reap benefits of close American relationship especially in economic arena but does not want to pay the price as a frontline state against China especially in the context of long history of American unreliability. Indian efforts have already been set in motion to mend fences with China with dual purpose of military (less strain on eastern border prevents diversion of resources from western border and an incentive for China to not upgrade existing military relations with Pakistan) and economic (China is India’s second largest trade partner) reasons.
The current conflict was limited in scope, and one should not generalize the lessons. Both countries exaggerated their successes and downplayed failures. In conflicts of the last two decades, we have not seen dog fights of fighter jet – versus – fighter jet but the current aerial battlefield is more about training combined arms personnel for a network centric warfare by integrating diverse offensive and defensive weapons platforms and electronic warfare. Pakistan showed an edge over India in integration but there is a long road ahead for both countries.
India and Pakistan have steadily increased their short, medium, and long-range Surface to Surface (SS) missiles arsenal over the last two decades. SS missiles and drones played an important part in the second phase of the conflict. Both countries used domestic made SS missiles and they will continue to enhance the capabilities of existing arsenal by improving precision and increasing range.
Drones are the newest fad due to their extensive use in recent conflicts in Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Iran war. However, scrutiny of its use in these conflicts provides a more realistic picture. Turkish Bayraktar – TB2 drones were highly effective in destroying Russian tanks and combat vehicles, but it was more due to lack of preparation of Russian forces. This advantage lasted only in the first three months of the conflict and once the initial surprise element faded and Russian air defense and electronic jamming got into the game, Bayraktar drones were quickly scaled back due to their ineffectiveness. They are now only used for surveillance and assisting other platforms such as artillery coordination. In the case of Israel, their drones operated in the un-contested air space that leaves many questions about efficacy in a robust contested air space. Azerbaijan successfully used both Israeli and Turkish drones in the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh. However, it should be remembered that Azerbaijani drones operated in uncontested air space as Armenia has no meaningful air defense infrastructure mainly consisting of obsolete Russian system. (Interestingly some air defense component of Armenia is acquired from India).
Pakistan mostly used domestically produced but less advanced Burraq and Shahpur drones for one-way attacks. Turkish Assisguard Songar and Chinese Wing Loong drones were also used for IS&R, air defense probing and strike missions. It could not be confirmed if Pakistan used more advanced Turkish Byraktar-TB2 and AKINCI drones. India mostly used cheaper but low tech domestic Rustom-2, Nagastra-1 and Archer-NG drones for one-way attacks. It also used Israeli Searcher and Heron for IS&R and Harpy and Harop for attacks. India has American MQ9B drones in its inventory that were acquired in a $4 billion defense deal, but these sophisticated drones were not used in this conflict.
Both sides used drones for oneway suicide attacks in this conflict. Main reason being that both sides do not want escalation and a drone is viewed as a less escalatory step compared to crewed aircrafts. Both sides will conclude that drone is a less risky option and in the category of a lower level of escalation ladder compared to other platforms such as fighter jets and SS missiles. It is highly likely that both sides will embark on major acquisitions of drones as well as increasing efforts of domestic production. India’s main drone inventory is Israeli made, and India will acquire more Israeli reconnaissance and attack drones. There will be more investment in domestic drone production but that will take some time. Pakistan will increase its acquisition of more advanced Turkish drones. Turkey as NATO member has access to advanced technology and in the last few years has leap frogged the sophistication of its drone supply chain. Turkish major drone production company Bayraktar has been working to improve its drones and recently completed upgrade of Bayraktar drone with two new versions. Bayraktar – TB2-AI with a turbo engine and incorporation of artificial intelligence has increased operational ceiling, speed and endurance and added autonomous flight path and route optimization. Bayraktar – TB2-S features satellite communication that extends its range and uses more advanced anti-jamming technology. Improved version of AKINCI with Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar, AI enhancement and a more advanced GOKDOGAN Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missile will likely be on top of Pakistan’s shopping list in view of increasing defense cooperation between the two countries.
Both countries will be seduced by the shiny offensive drones and their capabilities and anti-drone technology will likely get less attention. Emerging concepts of anti-drone technologies such as drone on drone, electromagnetic pulses, laser beam and electronic jamming will play a vital role in future conflicts as these emerging technologies will blunt the ascendancy of drones.
The Achilles’ heel in the recent conflict for both countries was Air Defense (AD). It failed at various levels in both countries. Contrary to claims on both sides, satellite imagery evaluated by independent analysts showed limited damage on both sides. This may be due to deliberate restrained action on both sides to inflict limited damage to avoid escalation.
However, the fact that hundreds of drones and SS missiles operated in the air space demands serious review. Both countries will be going back to the drawing boards to figure out how to defend against low and medium level threats as well as defense of the air defense assets.
India’s two-tier Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) consists of Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) for high altitude interception and an Advanced Air Defence (AAD) for lower altitude threats mainly for protection of strategic assets like nuclear sites and major cities. The backbone of Indian air defense is the Russian Triumph S-400 surface to air missile (SAM) system. India also operates indigenous manufactured short range Akash system mainly for protection of airfields and is working to improve the system with new Next Generation (NG) version. India also operates two versions of Israeli SPYDER for low and medium level threats.
Robust air defense is an expensive item on the defense ledger and a small country like Israel spent billions of dollars to protect its population centers from relatively low-tech and cheap rockets, drones, and missiles from its adversaries. India and Pakistan with a large land mass cannot afford a fool proof air defense. In addition, both countries are densely populated and all major cities cannot be protected as it is prohibitively expensive. Both countries will focus on improving air defense of major military installations and strategic assets with some coverage for large cities. India’s strategic community feels that they will continue to rely on domestically produced and Russian air defense systems in near future with focus on adding and improving existing systems. Russia’s own air defense needs for the ongoing conflict with Ukraine is a grave issue. Russia was supposed to deliver two S-400 systems to India in 2026, but it is not clear if Russia will be able to deliver in time. There is an opportunity for Israel to fill the gap by brandishing its success in blunting over 95 percent of attacks by a variety of incoming rockets, drones and missiles. Israeli Barak-8 system has been undergoing tests in India for several years and a more robust deployment will be likely in near future as well as acquisition and possible joint production of Israeli SPYDER system. The challenge for India is integration of diverse systems as this conflict highlighted the importance of integration that can serve as a catalyst to enhance performance of each component. Israel can HQ-19 come to the rescue in this field as it has done some decent work on integration technologies. Pakistan’s air defense doctrine is dictated by the ground realities of defending a large territory with extremely limited resources. A fragile economy that is heavily dependent on external assistance and domestic terrorism challenge does not allow for significant defense expenditure on items like AD. Pakistan found the solution by assigning territorial defense to the combat arm of the air force and AD of only air bases and strategic assets. Pakistan has no resources to provide defensive umbrella to major population centers. An offensive-defense element is added by using drones and missiles to target incoming threats at the sites of origin before they launch for their intended targets. AD is shared by the army and air force air defense assets and service rivalries usually hinder robust coordination. The degree of integration of army and air force air defense is not known but this item will likely be high on the agenda. Pakistan’s AD has mostly locally produced and consists of three versions of ANZA targeted against aircraft. Pakistan also has Chinese SA-2, HQ-7, HQ-9 & HQ-16A, and French Crotale and Mistral systems. Pakistan will mostly rely on domestically manufactured air defense that is inferior and will try to get more advanced Chinese platforms. Pakistan wants more advanced HQ-19 air defense system, but it is not clear if the Chinese have made decision on this subject. China will also rigorously evaluate performance of its AD assets in recent crisis to improve these systems.
Contrary to popular perception, decision making process at the highest level is usually not well thought out or conducted in a careful, calculated, and linear fashion based on a well-defined script. Decision making process is handicapped by the burden of multiple goals in an environment where information is incomplete, ambiguous and in some cases contradictory and policy options are constrained by internal and external factors. This results in unfolding events taking control of the decision-making process rather than execution of a pre-determined policy. This was the case for both India and Pakistan where initial actions were based on pre-existing ideas and policy prescriptions but very quickly decision makers on both sides became hostage to the rapidly unfolding events. The result was that within seventy hours both sides were left with essentially no viable option that resulted in an embarrassment to both countries where ceasefire was announced by President Trump’s weekend tweet.
National pride, domestic political considerations, and personal and institutional interests can impede honest reflection. With a pre-existing mindset, the learning process can simply reinforce existing doctrines leading to wrong conclusions.
An effective and productive learning process depends on political will and organizational ethos to reflect critically and incorporate third party opinions and conclusions that are not straight jacketed by the national narratives.
“I guess every generation is doomed to fight its war, suffer the loss of the same old illusions, and learn the same old lessons on its own.” Phillip Caputo
